Articles
Children in Swat face bleak future ....... 19
End of the Line for Islamabad............... 21
Pakistan under pressure ....................... 23
Pakistan Government Faces Tough
War on Border .…………………………………. 27
The Pakistan Problem:.......................... 29
Put Pakistan “on the Table”.................. 31
Afghanistan is a failing state ...………….. 33
The Afghan Mission  ............................ 34
Facts Sheet on Swat............................. 36

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Working Committee
Zulfiqar  Gilani (Coordinator)
Inayat  Kakar
Jahan Zeb
Naeem Khan
 Noor Maail
Waseem Syed
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Pashtun Peace Forum
19 Beaverbrook Ave, Hamilton, Ontario,
L8W 3S9, Canada
E:pashtuninstitute@yahoo.com
Web: pashtunpeaceforum.org

Editorial: Taking Stock One-Year On

The Pashtun Peace Forum Canada had its first anniversary on January 1, 2009. We take this opportunity to remind ourselves and our well-wishers about what we stand for. We believe this is necessary because it is easy to be pulled by events and lose one’s way, forgetting the founding purposes.

The Pashtun Peace Forum (PPF) is in essence not an activist group but aims to foster peace in the Pashtun areas through facilitating dialogue, discussion, debate, and analysis. We are a forum where different voices are tolerantly heard and the process of evolving a common voice engendered. The PPF plays a bridging role, receiving inputs, integrating them, developing possible peace-fostering scenarios, and sharing those with the various actors in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the West.

We also believe that to tackle a complex situation like the one that prevails in the Pashtun areas, one has to be non-partisan, not ideologically driven, pragmatic, and humane in one’s approach. Our founding assumption is that ordinary Pashtuns, like any other people, want to live in peace, so that they may progress and prosper. Our attempt is therefore to connect with and strengthen such longings and thereby work towards reducing and eliminating the forces of extremism, violence, and destruction.

Unfortunately during its first year of existence (2008) we saw a rapid escalation in violence, the disruption of everyday life of Pashtuns, and the destruction of precious lives. We, along with many others, believe that the state agencies provided space and resources to militants and religious parties for short-term strategic purposes (See Farhat Taj’s article in this issue). We also believe that the state and Pakistani establishment are a major part of the current problem.  

In terms of the activities of the PPF during the past year, please remember that members of the Working Committee are working people, who have to squeeze time out of their schedules to produce this document and engage in other activities.

Although it is not possible to determine causality, but we believe that the Pashtun Peace Forum has contributed to leveraging concerned interest among Pashtuns and others regarding the many and severe travails that the people of Pakistan in general, and Pashtuns in particular, face day and night. We engaged over 1,000 members and readers through media releases, the IDEA magazines, presentations, and seminars. Members of our Working Committee have been interviewed by a wide variety of international media from diverse countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Canada. Again, information provided by the PPF has been widely disseminated electronically in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the UK, the USA, and Canada. The Pashtun Peace Forum also made successful presentations in consultation meetings and seminars, jointly with Council on Foreign Relations –New York, South Asian Peoples Forum and the various Canadian-Pashtuns groups.

Amongst our key successes in our first year has been continuing collaboration with Pashtun youth, and AIRRA; and providing initial support to establish the Pashtun Peace Forum-UK. We are now receiving requests from Pashtuns Diaspora in France and Germany to assist them in opening Pashtun Peace Forum chapters there. We plan to further involve the international community, the Pashtun civil society, the Pashtun political leadership, and others to facilitate the empowerment of Pashtuns to bring a non-military solution to the war on Pashtun land.  We are encouraged by the many communications from friends and readers from Canada, Pukhtunkhwa, USA, and Europe, which we greatly value and appreciate.

Finally, we facilitated screening of “The Frontier Gandhi: Badshah Khan, a Torch for Peace” film in Toronto, Canada, on January 14 and 15, 2009, with the support of ‘Peace on Earth Productions’ of Teri McLuhan, filmmaker and author.

We invite you to join us in trying to understand the current turmoil the Pashtuns are facing, and contribute to the movement towards peace and progress amongst a people who have been suffering oppression for long, but to who are facing increasing savage brutality in the recent past, which seems to be unrelenting. 

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Will the Gulai-Nargis (Narcissus) Bloom this Spring in the Swat Valley?

By Dr. Shaheen Sardar Ali
Dedicated to the girls of Swat who may never go to school again, from their sister who was fortunate enough to be educated

Today, the 15^th January 2009 civilisation, democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, justice and equity stand defeated. Today, the Government and people of Pakistan have succumbed to a disparate group of faceless, semi-invisible individuals hiding behind an opaque mask of religion and declared all girls’ education as outside the pale of Islam. ‘Iqra’[Read], a mandatory injunction in the Qur’an for every Muslim male and female, has been reduced to a meaningless word trampled under the feet of worldly gods speaking in God’s name. The great and glorious of the state of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, in a state of complete denial whine and whimper as the state recedes under their very eyes…………….. For today, the parallel ‘Taliban’ the only government with any writ in Swat has declared all girls’ schools closed forever.

But who cares for the Swat Pukhtuns from the back of beyond. Let them shut down girls’ schools and chop up heads, hang them from poles and tree tops. After all, Islamabad is thriving; we have a democratically elected President, Prime Minister and Parliament. Swat and FATA are very far away and only become significant when foreign masters are in town and demand action. After agonising, weeping, brooding and making angry conversations with whoever cared to listen, I decided to share these thoughts with anyone who may wish to read and capture the tormented soul of a Swati woman sitting continents away from her beloved homeland. Is the pain greater when one is far away from home and loved ones? Does everyone living in the ‘diaspora’ experience a sinking feeling at the sound of a ringing telephone in the early hours of the morning, fearing some horrible news waiting at the other end? Does everyone sit glued to the television set in the anxious hope of more news of Swat, FATA and the country?

How long before we will say: enough is enough and rise, speak and act? How much more suffering before we declare emphatically that we refuse to be harassed and silenced any longer and demand answers for the wrong doings meted out to us? How many more humans will have to be slaughtered, before we stand up and say NO! When will we shout from the rooftops of Mingora, Saidu, Kabal, Matta, Sangota, Manglawar, Chuprial, Dewlai, Madyan, Bahrein, Kalam: stop your underhand, hypocritical games, blowing hot and cold, killing us in the name of protecting us when all the while what is being protected, is power and wealth of a few and destruction of the people of Swat. Go and play your foul game elsewhere and leave us in peace. Stop our genocide!

But, who will listen to the pleas of the traumatised souls that are my compatriots: impoverished beyond belief materially, emotionally and physically. Not the evil Machiavellis of today who cast the net of violence over unguarded people going about their daily business. Not those perched in the superior location of the corridors of power and wealth, who are in a state of denial, simply looking the other way and celebrating their power and opportunity to humiliate the people of Pakistan by decorating the perpetrators of their destruction with medals.

It is that time of year in Swat when the harsh winter breeze cascades from the peaks of majestic snow capped mountains spreading its icy cold wings throughout the valley. As a child, I had bittersweet sentiments for these freezing cold winds as they coincided with my winter vacations from the Sacred Heart Convent in Lahore. Just when the sun would start shining every morning and I would want to play outside, the freezing winds would make me want to huddle indoors by the fire. One of my aunts [and later my mother-in-law] once told me why those far away mountains I saw were always to remain covered with snow… this is called the gunaangaar ghar [sinful mountain]… it is under a curse and destined to carry the burden of a snowy cap….Turning my head to the other side of the valley, I would see illum, another grand mountain lying between my home valley and that of Buner. This mountain held a more positive image in popular imagination as a saying goes in Pukhto: “May you become as tall in stature as the illum mountain.”

I now wonder whether it was us Swatis as well as that far away mountain carrying its ‘cursed’ load of snow all year round and visible only on clear sunny days from Mingora, that may have been under a curse. Why else has tragedy of the present proportion struck Swat and her people, making a reported 5 lakh people homeless, rendering as many others homeless and thousands dead or missing. What merited this punishment and terror, is a complex and mysterious saga details of which we may never fully comprehend. The stark reality is that hundreds of thousands of Swatis who have been peaceful, hospitable, people - now live a tormented life, inside as well as outside Swat and see their beloved homeland being destroyed by the histrionics of Machiavellian power play.

I know that at this tragic stage of our existence as God and human forsaken Swatis, it is all too easy to fall into the trap of recalling a romanticised past…. Yet for us forgotten and forsaken people, any respite must come from recalling our past and building on it towards a future. I cannot help but see, albeit in a mist and haze of tearful eyes and broken heart [but not broken spirit] images of those not so long ago times, when droves of tourists from home and abroad, would ply through the Malakand Pass and make their way to Swat.

We never used the word ‘tourist’ for these people coming from ‘khakata’ [‘down’ country]; everyone used the word ‘meylma’ [guest’] for these visitors and holiday makers, film production teams, honeymooners and families proudly showing off the ‘Switzerland of the East’ to their children who would then go back to school in Lahore, Rawalpindi, Karachi, indeed all parts of Pakistan, and narrate tales of the gushing waters of the river Swat, the tall pine clad mountains, the narrow dangerous roads, the clear sapphire blue waters of Mahodand [a lake beyond Kalam], the ‘white palace’ in Marghozaar where the tall mountains met…

I recollect those early years of my life when we had no piped water in the family home presided over by my grandparents, and when it was common every evening, before sunset, for women to walk through discreet side alleys, towards the ‘gudar’ (riverside) and ‘gaaga’ (streams) to fill their mangee [earthern ware vessels] with fresh, cold drinking water for their families. Images of dozens of women in their chaddars artfully balancing mangee on their heads and often one in their armpit walking single file down narrow lanes against the backdrop of a glorious golden setting sun on the horizon are still fresh in my memory. We children were not allowed to distract this daily ritual but on the rare occasion when my cousins and I would cajole our mothers and aunts into letting us accompany those assigned to fetch water, I would wonder why all the men suddenly seemed to ‘shy’ off and turn their heads towards the walls of the lanes, creating a ‘private-public’ space for women.

The male public sphere of this small village-like town would transform itself for a short while into female space with mangee-holding women gracefully navigating the streets and narrow alleyways. The same principle applied to the gudar where the family laundry was done. This truly was a picnic where one could simply rollick about in the green fields, tap your feet in the cold water of the streams, play hide and seek behind a bush, greedily pick the blackberries that grew along the stream, and the occasional scream when pricked unceremoniously by the thorns in the blackberry bush. There was the even rarer treat in the autumn when wild peas were in bloom and we could cunningly pick a few pods as we sauntered through the fields on our way to the water. I must emphasise that this was a regular all-women excursion and the only male intruder would be at midday when a male helper would bring the much-awaited lunch.

At about this time of year, in a few weeks perhaps, when the sun starts shining with a bit more courage and looks down on this icy cold valley, the gulai-nargis [narcissus] and ghaantol [wild tulips] will take heart and peep out of the muddy soil on the slopes of the adjoining mountains. Scores of women will be awaiting these first signs of the turning weather in the hope that they can go saaba-picking [edible green clover leaves, chives and a host of other saag type vegetation which is the staple food of most of the population]. Travellers along the road from Mingora towards Peshawar will find the familiar sight of young boys and girls holding up bouquets of narcissus and wild tulips for sale.

That is how I remember life growing up as a young girl in the Swat valley. My husband went to a co-education school in the town and his female classmates are grandmothers now. Sixty years ago in Swat, girls and boys went to primary school together; secondary and higher secondary schools for girls were full to the brim from where hundreds of young women ventured forth to the colleges and university if Peshawar and beyond. My induction as the first woman cabinet minister in the NWFP government in 1999 was widely hailed and men and women alike shared in what they saw as a collective pride and recognition of one of their own.

So, when, why, and how did the present nightmare unfold for us unfortunate Swatis? When did this serene, hospitable valley get chosen as the venue of game playing individuals and groups, local, national, regional, and international. What was/is the game plan, input and output and what is the desired result that perpetrators of the scheme aspire to achieve? Why choose Swat as opposed to adjoining territories with less accessibility to the outside world and governmental infrastructure. How true is it that so-called militant religious extremists are entirely responsible for all the horror, terror, death and destruction of Swat and Swatis and so-called ‘progressive’ democratically elected government is innocent and beyond reproach?

How true it is that the seeds of the present situation were sown by institutions responsible for upholding and protecting the national interest in 1994 when Sufi Mohammad took Swat and the entire governmental machinery hostage. The ‘black turbans’, as they were called simply emerged as if from nowhere and before anyone could take a deep breath, had spread themselves across the valley. The government of the time gave them some crumbs in the form of the Nizam-i-Adl regulation 1994, re-named judges and courts by using the names Qazi, Ilaqa Qazi etc., and assigned supposedly Shari’a literate muavin or advisers to assist the Qazi in administration of justice to make sure it was Shari’a compliant. People of the Malakand division as it was then called, had a choice to use the ‘Islamic law’ or the ‘regular’ law of the country. It is no secret that apart from a few women daring to challenge their male relatives to obtain their inheritance by using Islamic law, all and sundry stuck to the civil and criminal law of the country.

Some time later, dissatisfied noises started being heard regarding unsatisfactory nifaz/promulgation of Sharia, but it actually turned out that some of the muavineen, or ‘Shari’a conversant advisers, were angling for a raise in their salaries. This demand was of course met, as that was the easy way out and then forgot all about the underlying million dollar question: Was/Is there a popular demand for Shari’a promulgation in the region; how is this to be gauged; what is the problem with existing offerings and what/who is the underlying, simmering problem and issue’/s etc.

Why is it that this demand emanates not from more urbanised centres of Swat including Mingora, Saidu etc., but from outlying, rural areas where class divisions are more pronounced and landed class unpopular among the general population? Surely, if the demand was the result of delays in court and administration of justice generally, ought the people from the urban centres not likely to be the ones more affected thus proponents of the demand for Shari’a?

Leaving the above critical question on the back burner to simmer and exacerbate, we now come to  a neglected  governance issue in Swat. This is the issue of ‘custom-chor’ vehicles that have flooded the market. Cars, jeeps etc are available for unbelievable paltry sums creating avenues for all sorts of activities outside the purview of the law. Why was this not dealt with and nipped in the bud earlier on when the problem was first spotted. Receding and abdicating state control and remit are terms that come readily to mind. The question I pose here is: Was the state apparatus unaware of this and the wider, serious implications for government and governance not to mention the lost revenue and financial fallout? Is it rocket science to decipher the fact that when you give an inch, a yard is what is generally being conceded? The signal given to those who may have had intentions of violent adventures in the area would be quite clear: go ahead and do what you want; there is very little to stop you.

Deep in the forests of Swat, it was being reported that when government officials went on inspection tours of the area, they were stopped at the foot of the mountains where the thick pine forests started. The local population also reported periodic ‘earthquake-like’ happenings as if a bomb has gone off; they were spotting unfamiliar people on the roads, were generally confused but as unsuspecting people focussing on earning two square meals for their families, never thought more of it. Neither did they know whom to report this entire strange goings on to; who would listen to poor villagers in the first place?

Hospital staff in the several hospitals and health facilities recollect numerous men and women patients who ‘did not look like us’, spoke a very strong sounding language, the men had ‘long hair and sort of chinky eyes’, etc etc., These sightings started about two summers ago but no governmental, agency picked this up, or did they…….?

Is it possible that the few thousands of militants are so superior in arms and training that the 7^th largest army in the world is unable to out manoeuvre them? Are the government structures and institutions so weak that access lines to arms and ammunition cannot be cut off? But the critical questions of all, that Swatis are asking themselves and the world: Who are these ‘people’ who have captured their land, terrorised them to death, why and for what end and purpose? As citizens of this country, Swatis demand answers to these questions and for the government to take responsibility for leaving them without security, succour and sustenance.

The writer is Professor of Law, University of Warwick, United Kingdom, Professor II, University of Oslo, Norway and Member of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary detention. She was formerly Professor of law, University of Peshawar . She also served as a provincial health minister during the 2000-04 interim government. Email: s.s.ali@warwick.ac.uk

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Replicating the Al Anbar model in FATA?
Saturday, January 31, 2009, Farhat Taj
http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=159976

Al Anbar is a region in Iraq that was devastated by Al Qaeda inflicted violence. Several Sunni tribes of the region formed an alliance, supported by the US, and took up arms against the terrorists. The tribes successfully controlled Al Qaeda terrorism and stabilized the region. In media it was called 'Al Anbar Awakening'.
All over the world think tanks studying the situation in FATA debate and discuss whether an Al Anbar style awakening is possible in FATA? Can FATA tribes take up arms against the Taliban and Al Qaeda? In my opinion there is tremendous potential for an Al Anbar style awakening in FATA. But there is one huge obstacle: the mistrust of the tribes in the military leadership, especially the intelligence agencies. The Taliban and Al Qaeda have been target killing tribal leaders and so far the military has failed to protect the latter. So far no one has even been officially accused or arrested of the target killing of more than 200 tribal leaders.

The target killing of the tribal leaders started in South Waziristan almost at the same time when the US was bombing Taliban and Al Qaeda hideouts in Afghanistan in 2001 and the militants ran towards Waziristan. They were not welcomed by the tribal leaders. In order to have a strong foothold in Waziristan, the militants killed more than 120 tribal leaders. Clearly the then government of General Pervez Musharraf was playing a double game. On one hand it joined the US led war on terror, on the other hand it allowed the militants to kill the tribal leaders and replace the tribal order with the Taliban order.
Next the killing spree was taken to other tribal areas including Khyber, Orakzai and Bajaur agencies. There is a strong perception among many Pakhtun that this killing was carried out with tacit consent of the intelligence agencies of Pakistan to create full leadership space for Taliban in the Pakhtun tribal society. This is the key obstacle that is preventing the remaining tribal leaders and young people in FATA from taking up arms against the Taliban and Al Qaida.

Despite this there is still a strong potential in FATA tribal leaders and young people to challenge the terrorists. I conclude this from the surveys conducted by AIRRA, an independent think tank working on human security, regional cooperation and radicalization, previous events in the area and my personal discussions with young men and women of FATA: They pointed out that in tehsil Pranghar of Momand Agency, the people rose against the Taliban as soon as the Taliban first assaulted Momand Agency. Consequesntly, Tangi in district Charsadda is safe because of this event. Since 2004, we find sporadic uprisings against the Taliban but due to the inability of the Pakistani security forces, the leaders of Qaumi Lashkars (national laskars) were mostly target killed by the Taliban. If the elders and the youth of the Pakhtun belt are taken into confidence and assured that an anti-Taliban tribal army will not be marked for target killing, the uprising can succeed.

But for that to happen Pakistan army and the government of Pakistan have to take some confidence building measures to restore the faith of the tribes. I had discussions with some tribal men and women during my recent visit to Pakistan. They suggested the following as confidence building measures. One, some, if not all Taliban leaders must be target killed by Pakistan army. Two, all security forces must be issued a kill at sight order against the first and second layers of all Taliban and Al Qaida groups in Pakistan. Three, the government should announce head-money for killing or capturing any top, second or third level leaders of the Taliban. They also said that the Pakistan army must closely coordinate with the tribal armies made against the militants. They pointed out that the tribal armies had been fighting for days and Pakistan army, stationed near by never showed up to help the armies besieged by the Taliban till the armies were massacred by the

Taliban, armed with much more sophisticated weapons than the tribesmen. They said the tribal leaders must stay in some kind of hot line communication with the top leadership of Pakistan army and government and in case of any Taliban attack, Pakistan army must send air borne commandos to help the tribal armies. They also said if necessary Pakistan air force must carpet bomb the Taliban and they are not averse to the ISI buying some suicide bombers in some kind of intelligence cover and sending them to bomb the Taliban leaders in meetings, just like they bombed the tribal jirgas in FATA.

I would request the government of Pakistan and the leadership of Pakistan army to engage in discussions with the tribal leaders to work out details to form tribal armies, to take on the Taliban. I would request fellow citizens all across Pakistan to morally support such tribal armies and build up pressure on Pakistan army to stand by the tribal armies until the Taliban are controlled and writ of the government restored. I would also request the international community to keep financial plans ready for prompt reconstruction and development of FATA after the elimination of the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

The writer is a research fellow at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Gender Research, University of Oslo, and a member of Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy. Email: bergen34@yahoo.com

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A comment on Farhat Taj’s above piece, by Dr Noor Maail:

The article written by Farhat Taj is very interesting. She is really a brave writer. I have written a few lines on Genral Petraeus’ ideas (community army) implementation in FATA -Pakistan and Afghanistan.

We l know that a U.S. funded program to train and arm community members in Afghanistan's most dangerous regions as a way to defend against the Taliban has already begun. The U.S. will provide funds to arm the community force with the same weapons used by Afghan police. After training they will have the responsibility of protecting the people, providing security for the highways, schools, clinics, and other government institutions etc. Following this type of exercise, as practiced in Iraq (according to Farhat, Al Anbar), will land Afghanistan in the hands of warlords and the Kabul government will remain ineffective. For Afghanistan, my suggestion is to recruit and train more army to implement the government writ in the region/country. In my opinion, this will be a permanent solution to the problem.  

Practicing this community based army in FATA may be effective like Iraq, but we should not compare Iraq with Pakistan. FATA is under Pakistan, and Pakistan has an organized and trained army (around 700 thousands). It is the duty of the Pakistan government and the army to protect their people. If they are ‘unable’ or ‘unwilling’, then the state and the army do not have the right to claim this region as part of Pakistan. I don't think that the people of FATA will trust the Pakistani army and even if they trust them, their sincerity is highly questionable. The Pakistani government, military, and agencies have always sought the cooperation of radical/extremist religious leaders instead of the main secular Pashtun leaders, because state want the dominance of religious leaders as they are easier to manipulate.

Pakistan's military’s interests coincide with neither with the interests of the West nor of the Pashtuns. Keeping Pashtun nation divided and backward might serve the short-term militaristic interests of Pakistan, but it is already backfiring against the long-term interests of the West and Pakistan too. The West and Pakistan, instead of alienating and pushing Pashtun tribes further into the camp of extremists, could reach out, assist and empower secular and moderate Pashtun leadership. I think if Pakistani army and intelligence agencies want the integrity and stability of Pakistan they need to change their policies and should keep good relation with Pashtun nationalists in Pakhtunkhwah and Afghanistan instead of promoting religious parties and extremist forces.

(Dr Noor is themember of working committee - Pashtun Peace Forum and can be reached at nm7075@gmail.com ) 

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Rehabilitation Steps for Improved Governance in Swat Region
By: Shaukat Sharar

 “Tiny Swat is (was) Oasis in seething World” is the title of an article published by New York Times on April 27, 1950, written by C.L Suzberger. This explains the conditions in which the people of Swat used to live. Nowadays the newspapers writes: suicide attacks , Swat under the grip of militants, bomb blasts, deforestation, mismanagement of resources, unemployment, inefficiency of justice system, people beheaded and, military operation in full swing and so on are some of the headings of the stories   generated from the scenic valley of Swat; once a tourist paradise. The thrust is to find out answer to the question that how the region can get back the flavour of peace and prosperity, very much needed not only for the people residing in the valley, but for the rest of society as well. The valley offers a lot in terms of resources, if appropriate management structures are devised and governance patterns evolved.

Swat, as ex –state has a special constitutional status and needs to be elaborated and understood. It is neither a settled area; nor having the tribal administrative frame work like FATA. The people of the area vote, but their legislators can’t make laws for them and the laws are extended only by the governor with the approval of the president. There is a need to make legislation in compatibility with the local norms and having room for participation for the stakeholders in decision making process. It should be based on natural principles rather than technical laws, the answer may be some thing in between. It will be helpful for the rest of the country as well to experiment viable governance frameworks to transform the colonial flavour of administration of crises management to welfare oriented approach in an efficient manner. The present local government system has not yielded the required results for the area so far.

Traditionally, the society of Swat revolves around land management systems, which has deeper sociological implications. This issue is very crucial because the land settlement carried out and revenue record developed in early eighties is confusing and has given way to a lot of disputes among the population, and between the citizenry and the state. 

The judicial system can’t get appropriate evidence to decide the cases on merit because different government commissions and courts have given verdicts in land disputes in contradictory manner. There is vital need for a revised government policy on the land management system to institutionalize the ground realities and provide space for better land use. That is one of the main reasons that people demand changes in the legal and institutional apparatus. The present revenue record also hinders developmental initiatives and can’t provide due support to other governmental organizations to take care of the peoples’ needs and initiate new projects paving ways for broader resource management frameworks.

A large proportion of the land is declared as forest land and the government is considered to be the owner, but for the local population, at large, it is not fair. A considerable chunk of population live on the so called “forest land”, and developmental funds from the government exchequer are spent to extend physical and social infrastructure to these areas. The forest department has grossly failed to protect the resources and devise proper steps for rehabilitation on continuous basis. There is a dire need to revise the forest policy, devising resource use rights that can fulfill the demands of most stakeholders in an equitable manner. For example, opening areas for tourism infrastructure and shifting from crown trees to fruit orchards to accommodate ground realities for improved livelihood compatible with global norms and commitments. People residing on hillsides have overwhelmingly supported revolts in recent past with the demand for “Sharia laws”, which they feel will provide them justice and prosperity.

Swat has a plenty of hydle power potential, very much needed for economic growth, and five letters of intents have been issued to private companies by the federal government. But the effected population has shown resentment to such initiatives and the companies have shown inability to correspond to the aspirations of the local population. In such agreements the government should consult the stake holders rather than embarking directly on such agreements. These initiatives should be clearly linked with broader planning and development frameworks of integrated resource management. It will then result in the improvement of the livelihood systems in short and long terms; and will inculcate patriotism with better sense of citizenry.

The mineral resources of the region are in abundance, but grossly mismanaged at the same scale. The classical example is “emerald mine” of Swat, having very good quality. No one knows that presently how it is managed and if any revenue is generated how it is spend on the welfare of the population. There is a dire need to develop a policy and support systems through which these mineral resources can be taped. The region is located near to china; the global production hub with improved land communication link with Pakistan. Apart from others, china may need these raw materials for their production houses. To be more optimistic, the region is a tax free zone and industrial estates can be established with the help of US and other allies to open up investment opportunities in the region to combat the unemployment. Poverty is considered to be the evil and gives impetus to all types of lawlessness and turmoil.

Tourism is considered to be the main economic activity in the valley. The region had all the pre requisites to support tourism, but it is grossly affected not only by the recent events but continuous negligence by the relevant circles. To initiate processes for improvements in relevant infrastructure to correspond to the thrust of urbanites, there is a need of conceptual clarity to differentiate between hoteling and tourism and to be  inline  with overall welfare and developmental frameworks. Some of the examples are; Swat has rich archeological heritage which needs special attention.  A country with Buddhist tradition, especially Japan has great interest in developing these sites. To focus on the region there is the need to differentiate  Udyana and Gandhara; and to frame appropriate steps to do conservation works and make it integral part of resource management systems. The present rules needs to be modified to make it compatible with the present day conditions/ situation.  

River Swat is the back bone of the livelihood system of the valley, but in practical terms, if the current trends continue, it is going to be lost for ever. Its water is polluted which  is causing health hazards to the people. Its land is encroached upon by unorganized construction, depriving the visitors of the scenic view. The river’s potentialities are approached in bits and pieces by different institutional frameworks and there is a dire need to have coordinated efforts for applying planning tools, which can then give way to appropriate management apparatus. Presently the functions are scattered around different government departments and most of them are virtually unable to correspond at minimum level, for what they are mandated. This river is a treasure for the national integrity and prosperity; as it is the only main river originated from the soil of Pakistan.

 Swat is getting a lot of expatriate money; which mainly goes to the real estate sector with out any land use control due to un-availability of secure investment opportunities. Absence of planning and appropriate building by-laws is allowing distorting the face of scenic Swat and affecting the physical and social infrastructure very badly; giving way to litigation in many cases. Through public- private partnerships, if due planning and management support is provided, these monetary resources can be diverted to other sectors mentioned above. Even though, proper housing is also the top priority of the growing population of the region with changing life styles as well as for those who intends to spend good summer in Swat to avoid harsh weather conditions of the plains. (An alternate framework needs to be devised even in this time of high crises in the region)

In the recent operation the people of Swat has overwhelmingly shown desire for peace; they will defiantly support initiatives for prosperity; if due care is taken of the vulnerable by government; while taping the resources in equitable manner. The technology to support such like initiatives is now available; to process the information in multiplicity; use it for peace building measures and should be used for prosperity and confidence building measures.

Now it is high time to update this information for developing a vision to provide basis for prosperous future and to reconstruct the tarnished image of the region regarding law and order situation. All this can then transform the signals of the caring state having love for its citizenry. Swat has all the potentialities to be showcased as a symbol of peace in the current global scenario.

The government has already hinted of offering a development package and the president of Pakistan has said that the operation in the region was vital for the integrity of the country, it is evident that the region has geo strategic location and has global implications to shape the future world. It is high time that the system with political well has to put all its efforts to device a framework in consultative manner with the populace and other wings of the system and actors so as to correspond to the potentialities of the region in a judicious manner for sustained harmony; keeping in view the global realities having respect for the diversity with knowledge based solutions.

Email: shaukatsharar@gmail.com

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Plight of women in Swat

By Khurshid Khan, Dec 31, 2008

http://dawn.com/2008/12/31/ed.htm#5

THE current situation in Swat is such that any sign of peace in the valley has been washed away. The people are living through the most miserable phase of their history. No doubt, the valley has witnessed invasions, turbulence, and chaos from the time of Alexander’s invasion in 327 BC to the formation of Swat state in 1917.

However, at least in living memory the present chaos engendered by militancy has no parallel. It has adversely affected the physical and cultural environment, the economy, tourism, trade, governance and social life in the valley.

Unfortunately, in all this, women have been the worst sufferers. The militants’ obscurant version of Islam begins and ends with womenfolk. According to their belief, women are the source of all sins. A cleric while delivering the Friday sermon in Marghazar village was heard telling his flock, “My fellow Muslims, listen! The prices of daily commodities are rising because women abandon their homes and loiter about in the markets.”

In fact, the Fazlullah-led militants have announced a complete ban on female education from Jan 15, 2008 on FM radio. Some days ago, they announced that no government or private educational institution would be allowed to enroll girls and that all schools and colleges should stop educating them by Jan 15. Schools found violating this ban would be blown up. Taliban spokesman Muslim Khan somewhat modified the announcement saying that schools would remain closed until an Islamic curriculum was devised for imparting education to girls.

Parents and students have lost hope of schools reopening in this volatile atmosphere. The militants have usually been seen to follow up on their words and, despite the army’s presence, there have been no signs of the restoration of peace and harmony.

The militants have bombed or torched more than 100 girls’ schools and colleges to forcibly stop 80,000 girls from going to school in the district. There were 10 high schools, four higher secondary schools and four degree-awarding colleges and a network of primary schools across the district for girls and women, besides a postgraduate institution for young men and women to study at the master’s level.

Against the culture of keeping womenfolk away from development, the rulers of Swat state (1917-1969) encouraged female literacy, the first step on the way to progress, by establishing girls’ schools and colleges. The valley had the highest female literacy rate as compared to neighbouring districts.

After the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, their repressive activities started getting support in the Pakhtun areas of Pakistan along the Durand Line. Swat is among the more recent victims of Talibanisation. The secular nature of Swati society is slowly and gradually leaning towards extremism.

The clergy first started speaking against girls’ and women’s education through unauthorised FM radios and at public gatherings. But as they got more emboldened, they attempted to stall female education — and eliminate the presence of girls and women in the market — through fiercer means including bomb blasts. Many schools have been destroyed in this way.

Then they turned their wrath on women doctors and the female nursing staff in hospitals warning them to observe strict purdah, confine themselves only to wards for women and not to attend calls on their cellphones. The medical superintendent of a group of hospitals complied with the order and circulated a notice to the entire female staff telling them to do as they had been told. Women patients and visitors were also advised to conform to Taliban instructions.

Militants also ordered the segregation of students at the Saidu Medical College, telling the principal to keep away women students from research labs after a certain time. Meanwhile, another college refused to take in women because of the continuous threats of the militants from 2007 onwards. Militants regularly monitor hospitals and colleges. In fact, working women and those attending school or college, or going to the doctor or in the marketplace are given a bad character by the militants.

Indiscriminate mortar shelling has hit houses and killed and injured civilians. In these, the toll for women casualties has been higher since they are more often at home, while unannounced road obstructions or curfews have made sudden medical emergencies, especially among pregnant women, difficult to be attended to. As a consequence women have lost their newborns as they have not been able to make it to the hospital in time. Besides, with their men also casualties of militancy, many of them are losing breadwinners in the family.

The threatened closure of educational institutions has proved to be the last nail in the coffin. The mindset of the militants — who routinely resort to the violation of fundamental rights in order to accomplish their goal — is clear and their misused and illegal authority has led them to establish a state within a state. Swat is not a no-man’s-land and is very much an integral part of the country. By tradition its inhabitants are not religious bigots. In fact, society in Swat is more civilised and accommodating of opinions than the rest of the Pakhtun belt. Islamabad should understand that and break its silence to take assertive action against the militants if it does not want Talibanisation to engulf the area and paralyse the entire structure of society.

Where are all the international and national human rights organisations and women rights groups? They must raise a collective voice against this victimisation of Swati women and girls. It is also time for the media to take drastic steps to highlight the current lot of Swati women whose repressive treatment should also serve as a wake-up call for women parliamentarians to take an active part in rescuing them from the spread of a venomous culture. Email: udyana64@yahoo.com

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Diary of a Pakistani schoolgirl – Part I

By Abdul Hai Kakar

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7834402.stm

Private schools in Pakistan's troubled north-western Swat district have been ordered to close in a Taleban edict banning girls' education. Militants seeking to impose their austere interpretation of Sharia law have destroyed about 150 schools in the past year. Five more were blown up despite a government pledge to safeguard education, it was reported on Monday. Here a seventh grade schoolgirl (Gul Makai) from Swat chronicles how the ban has affected her and her classmates. The diary first appeared on BBC Urdu online.

THURSDAY JANUARY 15: NIGHT FILLED WITH ARTILLERY FIRE

The night was filled with the noise of artillery fire and I woke up three times. But since there was no school I got up later at 10 am. Afterwards, my friend came over and we discussed our homework.

The Taleban have repeatedly targeted schools in Swat

Today is 15 January, the last day before the Taleban's edict comes into effect, and my friend was discussing homework as if nothing out of the ordinary had happened.

Today, I also read the diary written for the BBC (in Urdu) and published in the newspaper. My mother liked my pen name 'Gul Makai' and said to my father 'why not change her name to Gul Makai?' I also like the name because my real name means 'grief stricken'.

My father said that some days ago someone brought the printout of this diary saying how wonderful it was. My father said that he smiled but could not even say that it was written by his daughter.

WEDNESDAY 14 JANUARY: I MAY NOT GO TO SCHOOL AGAIN

I was in a bad mood while going to school because winter vacations are starting from tomorrow. The principal announced the vacations but did not mention the date the school was to reopen. This was the first time this has happened.

In the past the reopening date was always announced clearly. The principal did not inform us about the reason behind not announcing the school reopening, but my guess was that the Taleban had announced a ban on girls' education from 15 January.

This time round, the girls were not too excited about vacations because they knew if the Taleban implemented their edict they would not be able to come to school again. Some girls were optimistic that the schools would reopen in February but others said that their parents had decided to shift from Swat and go to other cities for the sake of their education.

Since today was the last day of our school, we decided to play in the playground a bit longer. I am of the view that the school will one day reopen but while leaving I looked at the building as if I would not come here again.

FRIDAY 9 JANUARY: THE MAULANA GOES ON LEAVE?

Today at school I told my friends about my trip to Bunair. They said that they were sick and tired of hearing the Bunair story. We discussed the rumours about the death of Maulana Shah Dauran, who used to give speeches on FM radio. He was the one who announced the ban on girls attending school.

Some girls said that he was dead but others disagreed. The rumours of his death are circulating because he did not deliver a speech the night before on FM radio. One girl said that he had gone on leave.

Since there was no tuition on Friday, I played the whole afternoon. I switched on the TV in the evening and heard about the blasts in Lahore. I said to myself 'why do these blasts keep happening in Pakistan?'

WEDNESDAY 7 JANUARY: NO FIRING OR FEAR

I have come to Bunair to spend Muharram (a Muslim holiday) on vacation. I adore Bunair because of its mountains and lush green fields. My Swat is also very beautiful but there is no peace. But in Bunair there is peace and tranquillity. Neither is there any firing nor any fear. We all are very happy.

Today we went to Pir Baba mausoleum and there were lots of people there. People are here to pray while we are here for an excursion. There are shops selling bangles, ear rings, lockets and other artificial jewellery. I thought of buying something but nothing impressed - my mother bought ear rings and bangles.

MONDAY 5 JANUARY: DO NOT WEAR COLOURFUL DRESSES

I was getting ready for school and about to wear my uniform when I remembered that our principal had told us not to wear uniforms - and come to school wearing normal clothes instead. So I decided to wear my favourite pink dress. Other girls in school were also wearing colourful dresses and the school presented a homely look. My friend came to me and said, 'for God's sake, answer me honestly, is our school going to be attacked by the Taleban?' During the morning assembly we were told not to wear colourful clothes as the Taleban would object to it.

I came back from school and had tuition sessions after lunch. In the evening I switched on the TV and heard that curfew had been lifted from Shakardra after 15 days. I was happy to hear that because our English teacher lived in the area and she might be coming to school now.

SUNDAY 4 JANUARY: I HAVE TO GO TO SCHOOL

Today is a holiday and I woke up late, around 10 am. I heard my father talking about another three bodies lying at Green Chowk (crossing). I felt bad on hearing this news. Before the launch of the military operation we all used to go to Marghazar, Fiza Ghat and Kanju for picnics on Sundays. But now the situation is such that we have not been out on picnic for over a year and a half.

We also used to go for a walk after dinner but now we are back home before sunset. Today I did some household chores, my homework and played with my brother. But my heart was beating fast - as I have to go to school tomorrow.

SATURDAY 3 JANUARY: I AM AFRAID

I had a terrible dream yesterday with military helicopters and the Taleban. I have had such dreams since the launch of the military operation in Swat. My mother made me breakfast and I went off to school. I was afraid going to school because the Taleban had issued an edict banning all girls from attending schools.

Only 11 students attended the class out of 27. The number decreased because of Taleban's edict. My three friends have shifted to Peshawar, Lahore and Rawalpindi with their families after this edict.

On my way from school to home I heard a man saying 'I will kill you'. I hastened my pace and after a while I looked back if the man was still coming behind me. But to my utter relief he was talking on his mobile and must have been threatening someone else over the phone.

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Diary of a Pakistani schoolgirl – Part II

By Abdul Hai Kakar

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7848138.stm

THURSDAY 22 JANUARY : VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION

I am quite bored sitting at home following the closures of schools.

Some of my friends have left Swat because the situation here is very dangerous. I do not leave home. At night Maulana Shah Dauran (the Taleban cleric who announced the ban on girls attending school) once again warned females not to leave home.

The Taleban routinely carry out public floggings in Swat

He also warned that they would blow up those schools which are used by the security forces as security posts.

Father told us that security forces have arrived at the boys' and girls' school in Haji Baba area. May God keep them safe. Maulana Shah Dauran also said in his speech on FM radio that three 'thieves' will be lashed tomorrow and whoever wants to see can come and watch.

I am surprised that when we have suffered so much, why people still go and watch such things? Why also doesn't the army stop them from carrying out such acts? I have seen wherever the army is there is usually a Taleban member nearby, but where there is a Taleban member the army will always not go.

MONDAY 19 JANUARY: ARMY IN THEIR BUNKERS

Five more schools have been destroyed, one of them was near my house. I am quite surprised, because these schools were closed so why did they also need to be destroyed? No one has gone to school following the deadline given by the Taleban.

The authorities are accused of doing little to protect schools

Today I went to my friend's house and she told me that a few days back someone killed Maulana Shah Dauran's uncle; she said that it may be that the Taleban destroyed the schools in anger at this.

She also said that no one has made the Taleban suffer but when they are hurt they take it out on our schools. But the army is not doing anything about it. They are sitting in their bunkers on top of the hills. They slaughter goats and eat with pleasure.

FRIDAY 18 JANUARY: NO POLICE IN SIGHT

My father told us that the government would protect our schools. The prime minister has also raised this issue. I was quite happy initially, but now I know but this will not solve our problem. Here in Swat we hear everyday that so many soldiers were killed and so many were kidnapped at such and such place. But the police are nowhere to be seen.

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Diary of a Pakistani schoolgirl – Part III

By Abdul Hai Kakar

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7861053.stm

WEDNESDAY 28 JANUARY: TEARS IN THE EYES OF MY PARENTS

My father fulfilled his promise and we reached Islamabad yesterday. On our way from Swat I was very scared because we had heard that the Taleban conduct searches. But nothing of the sort happened to us. It was instead the army who conducted the search. The moment we left Swat our fears also subsided.

Many are opposed to the militants' policy of closing girls' schools

We are staying with our father's friend in Islamabad. It is my first visit to the city. It's beautiful with nice bungalows and wide roads. But as compared to my Swat city it lacks natural beauty. Father took us to Lok Virsa museum and I learnt a lot. We also have such a museum in Swat but I don't know if it will remain undamaged from the fighting.

My father bought popcorn from an old man outside Lok Virsa. When the vendor spoke to us in Pashtu my father asked him if he was from Islamabad. The old man replied: "Do you think Islamabad can ever belong to Pashtuns?"

He said that he hailed from Momand Agency, but because of an ongoing military operation was forced to leave his abode and head for the city. At that moment I saw tears in my parents' eyes.

MONDAY 26 JANUARY: HELICOPTER TOFFEES

I woke to the roar of heavy artillery fire early in the morning. Earlier we were afraid of the noise of helicopters and now the artillery. I remember the first time when helicopters flew over our house on the start of an operation. We got so scared that we hid.

All the children in my neighbourhood were also very scared.

One day toffees were thrown from the helicopters and this continued for some time. Now whenever we hear the choppers flying we run out and wait for the toffees but it does not happen anymore. A while back my father gave us the good news that he was taking all of us to Islamabad tomorrow. We are very happy.

SATURDAY 24 JANUARY: NO NAMES ON THE HONOURS BOARD

Our annual exams are due after the vacations but this will only be possible if the Taleban allow girls to go to school. We were told to prepare certain chapters for the exam but I do not feel like studying.

As from yesterday the army has taken control of the educational institutions for protection. It seems that it is only when dozens of schools have been destroyed and hundreds others closed down that the army thinks about protecting them. Had they conducted their operations here properly, this situation would not have arisen.

Muslim Khan (a Swat Taleban spokesman) has said that those schools housing the army would be attacked. We will be more afraid of having the army in our schools than ever. There is a board in our school which is called the Honours Board. The name of the girl achieving the highest marks in annual exams is put on this board. It seems that no names will be put on it this year.
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Children in Swat face bleak future

 BBC Wednesday, 28 January 2009 ,Ilyas Khan

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7855198.stm

Many  families in Swat district, in Pakistan's embattled north-west, are packing up and leaving after Islamist militants began attacking schools, reports the BBC's M Ilyas Khan, who is travelling in the region.

Nearly 200 schools in Swat have been attacked in the past 20 months.

Can the security forces establish the government's rule in Swat and protect schools against attacks by Islamist militants? Will the militants revoke the ban they recently announced on girls' education before the winter vacations are over?

For parents of schoolchildren who can afford to leave Swat and settle elsewhere, the answer is obvious. Leave. For those who have to remain, there are no easy answers. People are generally sceptical about the ability of the security forces to push the insurgents into a corner before 1 March, when school vacations end.

"Taleban are everywhere, but the army is only behind barricades," says one resident who, like most people in Swat these days, does not want to be named. "It can only make things worse."

Morale

More than a week ago, a Taleban deadline to ban female education came into force. The militants also bombed a number of schools, including those of boys, casting a shadow over the future of education here. The army is now moving into the remaining school buildings to protect them against possible Taleban attacks. But parents fear that schools where the army is deployed will attract more deadly attacks by the militants, endangering the lives of their children.

Swat is paralysed by a two-year-long armed insurgency by Taleban militants, who want to impose their brand of Islamic law in the district. The government moved in thousands of troops in the last quarter of 2007 to try to contain the insurgency. During this time, the militants have been able to put the security forces on the defensive by conducting a spate of suicide attacks on checkpoints, convoys and camps. The forces have also provoked anger among people by causing "collateral damage" as they struggle to hit militants who mix freely with the civilian population.

This appears to have hurt the morale of the troops and has boosted that of the militants.

The militants now control most areas outside the main town of Mingora and have a strong intelligence network within it. Destroying the government's education infrastructure is one aspect of the Taleban's campaign to uproot the existing system and replace it with their own. "In about 20 months or so, we have had 187 of our schools bombed out, of which 121 are girls' schools," says Sher Afzal Khan, the district head of the education department. Another 86 schools cannot be used because they are camps for the army or the Taleban, or they are in combat zones where children and staff cannot go, he says.

"Nearly 60,000 students have been affected," says Mr Khan.

Institutions of higher learning are no exception. "Three months ago, the Taleban banned male medical students from attending practical lessons in the gynaecology ward and the labour room," says a professor at Mingora's Swat Medical College. Soon afterwards, the Taleban started sending representatives to keep a watch at the college hospital to ensure the ban was not being violated.

"We had to shift gynaecology classes to Mardan (another district in the north-west). There is now a proposal to shift the entire college to Mardan, along with its staff and equipment," the professor says.

Moving away

Khpal Kor (Our Home) is a local boarding school that made its name by offering education to orphaned children.

I hope the army will establish the government's writ in Swat in a month's time. If not, I hope the Taleban will revoke their ban on education Swat teacher Taleban stranglehold

The school's revenue system was designed in such a way that fees raised from every five children of affluent families, called the "revenue students", would pay for one orphaned child's education.

In addition, Khpal Kor ran a number of commercial ventures such as a tent service and an IT college to raise salaries for its teaching, janitorial and kitchen staff, all of them well-paid by local standards.

"The tent service closed down due to absence of tourists, and almost all the students of the IT college have left as their families moved to other cities," says Imran Khan, Khpal Kor's coordination officer.

"We also have information that more than half of our 500 "revenue students" are unlikely to return to school after the vacations as their families, too, have moved away. This will put us under pressure to provide for more than 100 orphans." But many parents are still here and their children face an uncertain future. "I have nothing but hope," says a college teacher who has a son and two daughters that go to school. "I hope the army will establish the government's writ in Swat in a month's time. If not, I hope the Taleban will revoke their ban on education."

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End of the Line for Islamabad

By Fareed Zakari, Newsweek, December 6, 2008
http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/articles.html

Unless Pakistan changes how it conceives of its interests and strategy, it will remain an unstable and distrusted place.

If the Mumbai attacks were India's 9/11, then it has responded quite differently than the United States did in the weeks following that horrible event. Much of the debate among Indians has looked inward, focusing on their government's lack of preparedness, poor intelligence and bungling response to the attack. Senior Indian officials have resigned, some evidence links the terrorists to the Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba, but the Indian government has not rushed to war. Even the Hindu fundamentalist Bharatiya Janata Party, traditionally ultrahawkish, is advocating "coercive diplomacy," calling on the world community to insist that Pakistan implement its U.N. treaty obligations to fight terrorism. India is showing restraint for some wise reasons—the two nations are nuclear—armed and a military strike would only inflame Pakistani nationalism. But a democratic government, approaching an election season, can only remain restrained if its restraint yields something. If not, South Asia—and that includes Afghanistan—is going to get a lot more unstable.

Some have argued that India should use its intelligence and air power to go after some of Lashkar's camps in the borderlands of Kashmir. But one would not need spies and airplanes to find the head of Lashkar, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed. He lives and works in Lahore. Of course, Lashkar was banned by the Pakistani government in 2002, but Saeed now runs its "charitable" arm, Jamaat-ul-Dawa, a large and growing force in the country. The problem with Islamic militant groups in Pakistan is not that they are hard to find but rather that they are in plain sight. The Pakistani government has never made a fundamental decision to turn its back on the culture of jihad.

When one speaks of the Pakistani government, it's necessary to be precise. The elected, civilian government appears to be something of an innocent bystander in this affair. Initially, President Asif Ali Zardari denounced the terrorists and offered full assistance to Indian investigators. His prime minister offered to send the head of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency to New Delhi to help. Then, after the Army weighed in, the offer was withdrawn. Zardari's statements became more evasive and defensive. If anyone wondered who actually ran the country, it soon became clear.

Whether the Pakistani military was involved in the Mumbai attacks remains unclear. The Indians certainly think so. "The attackers were trained in four places in Pakistan by men with titles like colonel and major. They used communication channels that are known ISI channels. All this can't happen without the knowledge of the military," one Indian official told me. They're not alone in their suspicions. "This was a three-stage amphibious operation. [The attackers] maintained radio silence, launched diversionary attacks to pull the first responders out of the way, knew their way around the hotels, were equipped with cryptographic communications, credit cards, false IDs," says David Kilcullen, a counter-insurgency expert who has advised Gen. David Petraeus. "It looks more like a classical special forces or commando operation than a terrorist one. No group linked to Al Qaeda and certainly not Lashkar has ever mounted a maritime attack of this complexity." Which would be worse: if the Pakistani military knew about this operation in advance, or if they didn't?

The situation in South Asia is very complicated. But one thing is clear. All roads lead through Rawalpindi, the headquarters of the Pakistani military. For decades it has sponsored militant groups like Lashkar and the Taliban as a low-cost strategy to bleed India and influence Afghanistan. It now faces a choice. Unless Pakistan changes how it conceives of its interests and strategy, the country will remain an unstable place, distrusted by all its neighbors. Even the Chinese, longtime allies, have begun worrying about the spread of Islamic extremism. Pakistan needs to take a civilian, not a military, view of its national interest, one in which good relations with India lead to trade, economic growth and stability. Of course, in such a world Pakistan wouldn't need a military that swallows up a quarter of the government's budget and rules the country like a privileged elite.

The one country that could do more than any other to change the military's mind-set is America. For India to bomb some Lashkar training camps would be to attack the symptoms, not the source of the rot—and would only fuel sympathy for the militants among ordinary Pakistanis. To the contrary, what the world needs is for Pakistan to decide on its own that its prospects are diminished by tolerance of such groups. American diplomacy has been fast and effective so far. But we must keep the pressure on Islamabad, and get countries like China and Saudi Arabia involved as well. President-elect Barack Obama has proposed aid to Pakistan that has sensible conditions attached, meant to help modernize the country.

America also has much to lose if things fall apart in South Asia. If tensions between India and Pakistan rise, distracting the Pakistani military from the jihadists in its tribal areas, it will lead to much greater instability in Afghanistan and a freer hand for the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Washington, too, needs to see results.

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Pakistan Under Pressure

By Vanessa M. Gezari Updated Friday, Jan. 2, 2009

http://www.slate.com/id/2207740

Militants are gaining territory—and strength—with astonishing speed.

Mohammad Rehan, a watchman at a transport lot attacked by the Taliban, surveys ruined
vehiclesPESHAWAR, Pakistan—The fields stretched to the horizon beneath a mild winter sun. A stream ran through them, and somewhere off in the distance, behind a stand of apricot trees, smoke curled from the chimney of a mud-walled house. A narrow lane connected the house and the village life it evoked to the loud, modern asphalt highway skirting Peshawar. We stood alongside this highway, in one of the transport-company parking lots that have become the de facto boundary between

This wasn't always the boundary. The tribal lands don't officially start for another few miles beyond the outer edge of the highway, and those lands haven't always been thick with insurgents. But a series of violent attacks in December on shipping containers bound for NATO troops in Afghanistan are just one sign that the boundary between militant-held land and government-controlled territory is creeping inward with astonishing speed. One night last month, hundreds of Taliban fighters armed with rocket launchers crouched behind the apricot trees, moved purposefully through the grass, and finally, crying, "God is great," they launched a barrage of heavy artillery at the concrete wall that separates the lot—where the NATO shipping containers were parked—from the countryside. The wall came down, fighters streamed through the opening, and more militants appeared on the highway.

"I was on duty, but when I saw such a large number of militants, I ran," said Mohammad Rehan, a 21-year-old night watchman. "If you fire at them, it just creates a problem for you."

Militants have launched six such attacks in Peshawar since the beginning of December, destroying some 300 Humvees and other military vehicles as well as supplies worth millions of dollars. While these raids have obvious consequences for international troops in Afghanistan, they also mark a new level of insecurity for Peshawar, a city of universities, kebab stands, and carpet dealers that has always had an edgy border-town vibe but that now seems increasingly vulnerable to a Taliban takeover. Mahmood Shah, a retired army brigadier who lives in Peshawar, estimated that, based on the scale of the attacks on NATO supplies, it would take the Taliban as little as 20 minutes to gain control of the city's key administrative offices and essentially conquer it.

"It's just a question of time," Shah said. "Either the government becomes serious, or if the Taliban do it, I'm sure they will be faced …with a civil war sort of condition, because the people are arming themselves quietly. So you will find that the people will start resisting, thinking that the government is doing nothing."

Suicide attacks in Peshawar killed nearly 100 in 2008 and injured more than 200. In November, a U.S. aid worker and his driver were shot dead, two journalists were wounded in another shooting, and an Iranian diplomat was kidnapped. A December car bombing near a Shiite shrine at a busy market killed at least 18 and wounded dozens. Before dawn on Dec. 22, masked men attacked three of the city's elite English-language schools, two for boys and one for girls, tossing petrol bombs into classrooms, burning buses, and wounding several staff.

Since late summer, the Pakistani military has been fighting insurgents in the Bajaur Tribal Agency northwest of Peshawar, which lies on a key militant transit route between the Afghan province of Kunar and the disputed territory of Kashmir. It is also battling militants in the nearby Swat Valley, once a tourist destination, where insurgents recently declared a ban on female education and where reports of beheadings and public executions are frequent. The fighting has forced at least 200,000 people from their homes in Bajaur and pushed militants into areas that have historically been more stable, including Peshawar.

Malik Naveed Khan, inspector general of police for the North West Frontier Province, has primary responsibility for protecting Peshawar, a city of about 3 million. From his office in a compound straight out of the British Raj—white columned buildings, clipped lawns edged with chrysanthemums, servants bearing tea—he commands a force of 48,000 whose territory is effectively at war.

"I don't see this as a problem of the province, of the frontier, of Pakistan," Khan said. "I see it as a very, very serious international problem."

A gray-haired grandfatherly man who chain-smokes Dunhills, Khan estimates the enemy force at 15,000 to 20,000 fighters. But the problem is not so much numbers as resources. A police officer is paid $100 a month at most, Khan said, while the militants get about $165. Of the 1,000 police in the city of Peshawar, fewer than 100 are trained in counterterrorism tactics, only 300 have bulletproof vests, and one-third lack automatic weapons. Because of a shortage of ammunition and training, many police have not fired a bullet for the last four or five years. (For the sake of comparison, the New York Police Department requires officers to requalify on their weapons twice a year.)

"I want the West to know what we are in and to sound a bell of warning, because I have been telling everyone that this is not going to stop here," Khan said. "It will grow into the rest of Pakistan if it's not stopped here."

In 2007, Khan lost 72 police officers. By mid-December 2008, the annual toll was 148. More than 500 others have been injured, many seriously, losing limbs or eyes. Khan tries to raise morale by appealing to his officers' tribal pride, reminding them that the force has a long and brave history. Nevertheless, hundreds of cops have deserted in recent months at the urging of their families. Khan has raised death benefits for the relatives of officers killed in the line of duty from $6,300 to nearly $19,000 per cop, including insurance payouts, he said. Families of the dead are given a plot of land, and the sons and brothers of slain officers are offered jobs in the force.

To fund this, Khan persuaded the provincial government to raid its development budget, an unprecedented move. Like many, he sees development as key to countering the insurgency. He speaks of creating a version of Roosevelt's Depression-era Civilian Conservation Corps in the tribal areas to educate people and put them to work.

"They'll have something to lose, and then they'll stand up to these Taliban," he said. "They have nothing to lose."

The attacks on NATO supply convoys have other consequences for Khan and his police. The containers aren't just being burned, Khan said; some are being raided by militants and thieves. In the markets of Peshawar, anyone can buy military uniforms, helmets, night-vision goggles, and high-tech weapon scopes, he said. He himself had bought 500 or 600 pairs of U.S. military boots, at $30 a pair, for use by his traffic police. (He had considered buying bulletproof vests, too, but they weren't the right grade for the weaponry his men faced.)

When I visited Karkhano market a few days later, I saw what he meant. The market stalls lead up to the arched gate that separates Peshawar from the tribal areas, lining the road to the Khyber Pass into Afghanistan. A cop stood in front of the archway waving traffic through, while another, strapped with ammunition, eyed passengers sharply as they approached. The shops offered toy guns, toasters, and flowered bedroom slippers as well as a camouflage patrol cap made by Southeastern Kentucky Rehabilitation Industries, a nonprofit that employs people in work release and welfare-to-work programs, as well as the physically and mentally challenged, and describes itself as the "manufacturer of a multi-layered cold weather system … developed for Special Operation Forces."

We sat in the shop of a man named Mohammad Baz Afridi, whose shelves and display cases held DeWalt drill sets, various pieces of military gear, and, somewhat incongruously, a box of OB tampons. He showed me a Liberator II Soldier System Headset, covered in camouflage, with a mouthpiece and attached cord and plugs. The model is especially efficient because it can be used "with practically any portable radio model," according to the Web site of its manufacturer, Tactical Command Industries. (On the night of the attack at the transport lot I'd visited, the Taliban spoke constantly over wireless radios, and the night watchmen could hear commanders urging the militants on.)

Afridi served us tea in flowered china cups. He confirmed that some of his wares had probably been stolen from the NATO supply convoys.

"What will the transporters do if the Taliban come in their way and put guns on them and either kill the driver or the conductor?" he asked. "The transporter can't do anything, because the Taliban will kill him."

Among the more interesting items in Afridi's display case was a thick operator's manual for a laser aiming device that could be attached to a gun barrel, its cover marked "Department of the Army and Headquarters, Marine Corps." The manual described the product as "Class IIIb laser devices that emit a highly collimated beam of infrared light for precise aiming of the weapon." It continued: "The Aiming Lights are for use with Night Vision Devices and can be used as either handheld illuminator/pointers or can be weapon mounted with the included brackets and accessory mounts. In the weapon mounted mode, the Aiming Lights can be used to accurately direct fire as well as illuminate and designate targets." Afridi had sold the device, but whoever bought it had left the instruction manual behind.

Khan, the police chief, estimated that he would need about $300 million over the next three years to build a force that could stave off the militant threat to Peshawar. He said he would happily accept equipment in lieu of money, promising to return it when the fight was over. He had made his case to the government, members of parliament, think tanks, and the media.

"They come here, they listen to us and get very alarmed, but they do nothing," he said.

Indeed, the government in Islamabad seems numb to the threat. The day after the Dec. 22 school attacks in Peshawar, amid editorials calling them a milestone in insecurity for the city, the News, a Pakistani English-language paper, ran a story in which President Asif Ali Zardari declared that the situation in the North West Frontier Province was "improving." Last week, amid rising tensions with India in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks, Pakistan moved troops from the tribal areas to its eastern border. Although officials said the troops weren't engaged in combat, the areas they reportedly left behind—including South Waziristan, a tribal agency on the Afghan border southwest of Peshawar—are rife with insurgents.

On Tuesday, Pakistan shut down the road between Peshawar and the Afghan border while paramilitary forces raided the hideouts of criminal gangs and Taliban militants who officials say have banded together to carry out kidnappings and attack NATO supplies. But when the operation ends, the police will be on their own again. Peshawar is home to a military garrison and is considered well-defended, though the military presence seems to have had little effect on the deteriorating security situation. If Khan doesn't get more resources and training for his men, he fears that he won't be able to hold the militants back. And if he doesn't get help soon, it may be too late.

"These requests we fast-track, otherwise we don't need them," he said. "We lose the game."

Vanessa M. Gezari is a writer based in Washington.

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 Pakistan Government Faces Tough War on Border

Vol. 73/No. 1 January 12, 2009, BY DOUG  NELSON

http://www.themilitant.com/2009/7301/730103.html
After a yearlong effort, the U.S.-backed Pakistani military has made little progress in retaking control of Taliban strongholds in parts of the country’s northwest. From these bases, Islamist forces launch guerrilla assaults against U.S., NATO, and Afghan troops in Afghanistan.

In other parts of the country, the Pakistani government has taken steps to crack down on more Islamist groups following last month’s terrorist attack on civilians in Mumbai, India. The primary target is Lashkar-e-Taiba, the main organization implicated in the attacks in which some 170 people were killed, and one of many such groups that the Pakistani government has nurtured for years.

The United Nations Security Council passed a U.S.-backed resolution December 10 placing Lashkar-e-Taiba and four of its alleged leaders on a list of organizations that support al-Qaeda. Those on the list are subject to asset freezes, travel bans, and arms embargoes.

The resolution listed a charity group with substantial assets in Pakistan, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, as an alias for Lashkar-e-Taiba. Jamaat-ud-Dawa is headed by Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, a founder of Lashkar-e-Taiba. Saeed, who publicly disassociated himself from Lashkar-e-Taiba after the Pakistani government banned the organization in 2002, was one of those placed on the list.

The resolution was passed after the Pakistani ambassador to the United Nations made clear that Islamabad would take action against Jamaat-ud-Dawa once it was added to the UN list.

Pakistani officials then placed Saeed under a three-month house arrest. They also sealed dozens of Jamaat-ud-Dawa offices, arrested scores of its members, and froze the group’s assets. However, many facilities linked to Jamaat-ud-Dawa—which runs some 150 health-care centers, 8 hospitals, 160 schools, and 50 madrassas, or Islamic schools—remain open.

The Pakistani government officially banned Lashkar-e-Taiba in 2002 following a 2001 attack on the Indian parliament, which brought the two countries to the brink of war. However, the group continued to operate openly in areas of the country.

Following the Mumbai event, Islamabad also took steps against Jaish-e-Mohammad, another officially banned group accused of involvement in the 2001 attack on the Indian parliament. Pakistan defense minister Mukhtar Ahmed announced that Maulana Masood Azhar, founder and leader of Jaish-e-Mohammed, had also been placed under house arrest. However Pakistani ambassador to India Shahid Malik later said Azhar is not in Pakistani custody and no where to be found.

The Pakistani government has refused to hand over suspects arrested in the attack to the Indian government.

Lashkar-e-Taiba was founded at the end of the 1980s and had served Islamabad by providing fighters to the Himalayan territory of Kashmir, a majority Muslim area fought over between the governments of Pakistan and India. Lashkar-e-Taiba’s stated goals are to spread boundaries of an Islamic state under Sharia law, and force non-Muslims to pay tribute. The Islamist’s aim in the mass killing of Indians in Mumbai was likely to fuel sectarian violence between Muslims and Hindus and reignite armed conflict in Kashmir.

The Pakistani government has a long history of using reactionary Islamist movements to further the interests of the country’s ruling class. The Islamizing of the Pakistani state was carried out by the country’s military rulers, in part, as a counterweight to Baluchi and Pashtun nationalist movements on its soil. Later the Pakistani government established, funded, and armed Islamist fighters to extend its political influence in the region from Afghanistan to Kashmir.

Islamabad’s policy of support for Islamist fighters had previously also served the interests of U.S. imperialism—which backed Mujahideen forces against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s—until the U.S. rulers began to consider the establishment of the Taliban government resulting from that course as a problem.

Under heavy pressure following Washington’s invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the Pakistani government turned against al-Qaeda, elements of the Taliban, and other groups in the country. It launched a war against them in parts of Pakistan’s northwest, predominantly Pashtun mountainous region. Civilians have been killed in the crossfire, and hundreds of thousands displaced as a result.

While Lashkar-e-Taiba is based in the populous eastern Punjab province in Pakistan bordering India, the Taliban is based in the Pashtun area, which spans the Afghan-Pakistan border. In Pakistan this includes the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and northeast Balushistan. The Pashtuns are the dominant nationality in Afghanistan, comprising 40 percent of the population.

Fight against Taliban

Top officials of the NWFP provincial government held a special cabinet meeting on security December 21 calling on the Pakistani government to conduct a “more effective” fight against the Taliban in Swat.

The Pakistani military made initial progress against the Taliban forces in the northern Swat region of the country’s NWFP, where they launched a major offensive last year.

Beginning the second week in December, Taliban forces have carried out a series of assaults on NATO supply depots near Peshawar, the NWFP capital. The depots are part of the main route through Pakistan to supply U.S.-led NATO forces in Afghanistan. In two weeks, six attacks destroyed more than 300 military vehicles and supply trucks.

Sirajul Haq, the local leader of the Jammat-e-Islami political party, encouraged Taliban attacks at a December 18 demonstration of thousands in Peshawar, reported the Washington Post. Many truck drivers are refusing to carry supplies along the route.

Lt. Cmdr. James Gater, a spokesman for NATO forces in Afghanistan, told AP, “There is no indication to us that there is a disruption to our supply lines at this stage.” At the same time, Gen. David Petreaus, head of U.S. Central Command, said the U.S. military is looking into alternative routes.

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The Pakistan Problem: Success in FATA Depends on Aid to Civilians

Ahmed Humayun | 08 Dec 2008
World Politics Review
 http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=3012

In August, the Pakistani army launched a full scale military offensive in the Bajaur agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Since then, fierce clashes have resulted in the deaths of hundreds of militants and the destruction of key Taliban strongholds. This forceful demonstration of Pakistani resolve is a positive change from past efforts. However, military operations will fail if they undermine the single most important principle for victory: winning the support of the local population. And currently Pakistan is not aiding the war-ravaged Pashtun tribes of the FATA.

There is no doubt that significant force is required to eliminate the insurgent sanctuaries that infest Pakistan's tribal areas. The fighting thus far has revealed an extraordinarily sophisticated militant infrastructure: Subterranean passages connect heavily fortified compounds, and jihadists utilize heavy weaponry that includes anti-tank missiles.

But the eradication of some Taliban bases will be a Pyrrhic victory if the Pashtun populace perceives the assault to be against them, rather than against the extremists. An estimated 7 million Pashtuns live in the FATA, in addition to 28 million in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and 15 million in neighboring Afghanistan. The tribesmen viscerally distrust federal intervention -- and not without cause. Unlike the four provinces of Pakistan, the FATA is administered by undemocratically appointed autocrats with colonial-era powers; development indicators in the region rank among the world's worst.

Prolonged fighting has shattered Pashtun homes and livelihoods. Up to 300,000 people have fled the FATA in order to avoid being caught in the crossfire. Refugees are scattered across NWFP and eastern Afghanistan, desperately seeking shelter in improvised camps with no electricity or running water. Women find it difficult to maintain veiled segregation, a deep affront to conservative tribal sensibilities.

It will not take much more for the government to lose any lingering support for the counterinsurgency operations altogether. Troublingly, nearly four months into the military assault, government representatives admit that plans for basic health and educational services -- let alone large scale reconstruction and economic development -- have yet to get off the ground.

To prevail against the jihadists, Pakistan will have to integrate humanitarian assistance and long-term development into the counterinsurgency strategy.

The immediate, short-term priority needs to be ensuring that the refugees' most elementary needs -- shelter, food, water, clothing and electricity -- are attended to, particularly as winter descends. According to the United Nations, relief agencies have barely obtained half the funds needed to help the displaced persons. The United States and other donors should prioritize the fulfillment of funding shortfalls.

In the long term, reconstruction and economic development in the FATA has to be pursued with the same vigor as military incursions. The FATA Civil Secretariat, the principal Pakistani agency responsible for development in the tribal areas, has a multi-year plan that provides a useful agenda for action. The job programs envisioned in USAID's $750 million aid package for the FATA are also invaluable.

However, existing programs have to adjust to the grim reality that many refugees may not be able to return to their homes anytime soon. Fighting in the FATA is far from over and reconstruction and development in several areas will be delayed -- in some cases for years to come. The Pakistani government and international partners should think about feasible medium-term plans to integrate the refugees in the settled areas of NWFP.

Realizing these goals will be difficult given the challenging security conditions on the ground. Aware of the impact of humanitarian assistance in swaying Pashtun hearts and minds, the insurgents are steadily escalating attacks on aid workers. Therefore, increased security for aid personnel is critical. As part of this effort, the Pakistani military will have to participate in the actual provision of assistance in the most insecure areas.

There is time yet to prevent the Pashtuns from becoming permanently estranged from the rest of Pakistan. The raising of anti-Taliban tribal militias in recent weeks shows growing awareness among many Pashtuns of the threat posed to them by the insurgents. But if the government continues to communicate primarily in the language of guns and bombs, then the struggle against extremism may soon be perceived as a war against the Pashtun people. And neither Islamabad nor Washington can afford for this to happen.

Ahmed Humayun is a Joe S. Nye Jr. intern at the Center for a New American Security, and spent the summer of 2007 in the FATA and NWFP researching Islamist politics.

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Put Pakistan “on the Table”

By: Vanni Cappelli

That the Bush administration in the wake of 9-11 turned to the very entity responsible for turning South-Central Asia into a stronghold of Islamic militancy as a “key ally” against these same forces must stand as an instance of conceptual lag unequalled in the history of American foreign policy. Given Rawalpindi’s irreducible geostrategic paradigm of employing Islamic fundamentalism to crush progressive forces at home and extend its power abroad, it is as oxymoronic to look to it as an ally against radical Islamism as it would have been to seek to extend the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union into one against communism.

Pakistan’s army has shown persistence in its endeavors over many decades. Its ties to militants are not the vagaries of “rogue elements” but represent the integrated policies of the military-security services complex itself. Such an entity does not make a sea-change in its ethos merely because it has been threatened with dire consequences unless it switches sides—it only pretends to, especially if receiving billions of dollars in renewed military aid will be the result. 

And if some of Rawalpindi’s jihadi assets have slipped beyond its control while the army conducts desultory campaigns against militants to appease America, all the better for portraying Pakistan as a victim of terrorism, rather than the state sponsor of terror it has long been. Allowing a powerless civilian administration in Islamabad to be the public face of the country completes the illusion.

American military assistance to Pakistan over the last half century has enabled Islamic fundamentalism, perpetuated the India-Pakistan conflict, and led over and over again to death and destruction. It has prevented the development of democracy, civil society, and equitable economic relations in Pakistan. With mounting evidence that Rawalpindi continues to support the Taliban in pursuit of its historic goals, it is now being used to kill American and other coalition soldiers. 

The incoming Obama administration must confront this fact, and bring American national security policies in line with reality. Winning in Afghanistan means keeping Pakistan out of Afghanistan, and that means not only sending more troops and rebuilding the country, but forging regional alliances with nations whose ideals and interests dictate that they are actually with the United States in this fight. Democratic India, a rising world economic and military power which together with Afghanistan continues to bear the brunt of Pakistan’s recidivist behaviour, should have been the logical choice for “key ally” against terrorism once it became tragically evident that this behaviour had consequences for the United States as well. Yet the early strategic soundings coming from the Obama team are not promising. While correctly placing Pakistan at the heart of the region’s troubles, it seems to think that brokering an accord on Kashmir—with the major concessions coming from India—would somehow remove the incentive for the Pakistani army to support Islamists in Afghanistan, enhance the power of the civilian government in Islamabad, and pave the way for a lasting peace among the three countries.

This approach ignores the deep ideological basis of the ties between Rawalpindi and its jihadi assets, the enormous financial benefits that flow to the army as a result of its holding real power in the country, and the degree to which it sees continued conflict as essential to that power, providing as it does legitimacy to its leitmotif of “Islam in danger.”

Aggression can never be terminated by appeasement, especially when there is not a clear picture of the nature of the entity being appeased.

An American-Indian-Afghan alliance aimed at containing Pakistan is the only way to counter the fundamentalist geopolitical dynamic which produced 9-11 and the Mumbai attack. Such an alliance would raise an overarching security structure that would have the same effect NATO had on the Soviet Union. 

By cutting off military aid to Pakistan, naming it a state sponsor of terror, and working with its neighbors to contain it, the United States and its allies would effect the same internal collapse of a malevolent order as occurred when the Soviet Union’s weak economy proved unable to sustain its military superstructure. That would give Pakistan’s democratic forces their first real chance to take control of their country, end the army’s sponsorship of terror, and prevent future 9-11’s and Mumbais. For in the final analysis, historical pathologies can only be dealt with by a transformation of the existential situation in which they thrive, not by the policies of appeasement which have brought on our present crisis.  Email: vanni1964@hotmail.com

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Afghanistan is a failing state. It needs a Marshall Plan

Ashraf Ghani,Monday, 29 December 2008

http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/ashraf-ghani-afghanistan-is-a-failing-state-it-needs-a-marshall-plan-1214980.html

The Obama Presidency provides a second chance to get Afghanistan right. The President-elect has made it clear a stable Afghanistan is his priority. That stability will only come when Afghanistan can govern itself. To reach that point, three key assets must be harnessed: first, American forces and resources; second, the instruments of national and international power; and third and most crucially, the Afghan people, who are as eager to see the restoration of order and justice.

 The current impetus for a new perspective in US interventions comes from the military, in the form of the new counter-insurgency doctrine. Building on lessons learned by the British in Malaysia and the French in Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s, a group of thinkers organised by General Petraeus in the US have formulated the thesis that the struggle for the people is the central issue in any counter-insurgency campaign. While 20 per cent of the campaign might centre on use of force, 80 per cent depends on political and economic efforts. Under this doctrine, the definition of partners rests on the litmus test of dedication to the people. The incoming administration must translate this doctrine into a focused strategy for Afghanistan. This will require a fresh look at the polity, the economy, and foreign aid.

Afghanistan's first chance was in 2001, when the UN General Assembly and the Security Council resolved to create a legitimate government in Afghanistan. At that time, Afghans were united in requesting the deployment of forces to liberate and protect them and looked to the international community to solve 20 years of conflict. This open moment was squandered by a double failure: the Afghan political elite could not overcome their differences to become founding fathers of a nation; and international actors were fragmented and unable to build legitimate institutions. This created space for criminalisation of the economy, which fuelled the insurgency and corroded public sector integrity. Afghanistan has slipped 60 places in Transparency International's global corruption index.

The spread of corruption and bad governance imposes injustices, and often daily hardships, on ordinary Afghans, whose hopes for better lives are frustrated by the lack of services. These citizens want their current and future governments to be accountable.

Containing the threat of narcotics to the region and the world requires a bold economic approach. The break point between illegal and legal economies is a legal income of $4 per capita per day. In order to reach this threshold in Afghanistan, three major sectors of the economy must be revitalised: mining, agriculture, and services. Afghanistan is rich in minerals including copper, iron, marble, chromite, manganese and emeralds. With good governance in place, these assets can generate funds. Connecting farmers to markets through careful investment, organisation and infrastructure would provide livelihoods in rural areas. In urban areas, a fresh approach to municipal governance could mobilise the service industry, particularly construction, to create jobs. If Europe wanted to do more, a package of trade and enterprise partnerships could be as significant as any commitment of troops. And in the medium and long term, the most effective investment of all will be education and vocational training programs for the rising generations. Used for this purpose, one month of current military expenditures could change the life opportunities of five generations of Afghans.

The instruments currently used by the international community in Afghanistan, however, are part of the problem. The system can be made effective and efficient by eliminating the tens of thousands of scattered efforts, which create waste and parallel structures, and instead unifying foreign aid behind the single instrument of the Afghan national budget. The government and its international partners should delineate a set of objectives to deliver a dividend to the population and establish clear rules for accountability and transparency, including the creation of joint decision-making committees that bring international figures together with Afghan civil society and business oversight. This kind of partnership will require a new design for the use of aid, by a group similar to that which designed the Marshall Plan.

The present crisis was not inevitable, but rather the result of avoidable missteps. The Afghan population is still waiting, still hoping for an approach to answer their aspirations for a stable and just order. With that hope as its foundation, the right approach can bring Afghanistan to true stability.

Ashraf Ghani was Afghan finance minister 2002-2004, is the author of Fixing Failed States, and is chairman of the Institute for State Effectiveness: effectivestates.org

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The (Canada) Afghan Mission

Afghanistan, by the numbers

Jan. 17, 2008, CBC News

www.cbc.ca/news/background/afghanistan/bythenumbers.html

Col. Stephane Lafaut (left to right), Col. Francois Riffou and Capt. Bob Colborne get the lay of the land, Nov. 14, 2007, at the strongpoint in Howz-e Madad in Afghanistan. (Bill Graveland/Canadian Press)

Canadian troops in Afghanistan

There are currently three Canadian Forces operations in Afghanistan. The largest is Operation Athena with 2,500 troops. This is Canada's contribution to NATO's International Security Assistance Force. According to the Canadian Forces, this operation includes:

• A battle group in Kandahar.
• 30 CF members with the Multi-National Brigade Headquarters and Signal Squadron in Kandahar.
• 300 CF members with the National Command Element in Kandahar.
• 300 CF members in the National Support Element in Kandahar.
• 250 CF members with the Theatre Support Element in southwest Asia.
• Health Service Support personnel at the Multinational Medical Unit at Kandahar airfield.
• The Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar of approximately 250 military and civilian personnel.

The two other CF operations in Afghanistan are:

• Operation Archer, 30 soldiers involved in training and in the transition of security responsibilities to the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police as part of Canada's contribution to the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom.
• Operation Argus, 15 members of the CF called the Strategic Advisory Team, which works with the Afghan government to develop national strategies.

According to Esprit de Corps magazine, an estimated 200 members of the secretive Joint Task Force Two were expected to conduct special forces operations in Afghanistan in 2006.

The number of Canadian soldiers who have served in Afghanistan is more than 13,500.

As of June 2007, 60 Canadian soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan.

Cost of Canada's mission

The military costs for the mission in Afghanistan reached $2.6 billion in March 2007, or nearly $1.3 million per day of the mission. The costs are projected to reach about $4.3 billion by the planned end of the mission in February 2009.

Canada's spending for development in Afghanistan up to May 2006 was $466 million. By 2011, it is expected to reach $1 billion.

The Canadian Forces has spent over $1 million on funeral services for soldiers killed in Afghanistan.

Tim Hortons in Afghanistan

Establishing a Tim Hortons location in Kandahar has cost about $1.1 million for the first 12 months, according to the Department of National Defence.

The Kandahar location serves more than 1,000 cups of coffee a day to more than 7,000 personnel from Canada and other countries.

Other countries involved in ISAF

According to the International Security Assistance Force, there are 31,000 troops from 37 nations involved in the mission. (see table, right). Troop numbers are based on broad contribution and do not reflect the exact numbers on the ground at any one time.

Local forces in Afghanistan

• Number of members of the Afghan National Police: 55,000.
• Number of members of the Afghan National Army: 30,000.
• Pay given to the ANA: $4 a day.
• Pay given to part-time fighters for the Taliban: between $12 and $14 a day.

Afghanistan mission to cost Canada $18.1 billion -CTV (Oct. 9 2008). 

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Facts Sheet on SWAT-   Education & Other Vital Data
By: AIRRA – Pakistan, January 2009

I- Statistics on the number of girls affected due to the closure of schools

Total number of girls in public schools= 84248

Total number of girls in private schools = 3,5000

Total girls affected                                   = 119,248

Total number of lady teachers rendered jobless= 3425

II- UPDATES ON SCHOOLS DESTRUCTION IN DISTRICT SWAT

(UP TO.  26^TH DECEMBER 2009)

Schools	Completely Damaged	Partially Damaged	Total
Government Girls Schools	96	26	122
Government Boys Schools	25	39	64
Total	121	65	186

No of students affected

Schools	No of students in completely damaged schools	No of students in Partially damaged Schools	Total
Government Girls Schools	17380	7156	24536
Government Boys schools	6298	14670	20968
Total	23,678	2,1826	45,504

No of Schools occupied by Security forces            20

No of schools occupied by Taliban                            06

No of Schools closed due to fear                                               60

No of schools Specified for IDPs                                                01

                                                                                Total      87

No of students in the schools occupied by

Security Forces, Taliban/closed due to fear :        13,874

1.            Total Number of Students affected                         59,378 (23.17 % of total enrolled students)

2.            Total Number of Govt: schools in District Swat    1576

3.            Total enrollment in schools                                          265,170

4.            No of schools in Mingora city                                      27

Security Forces have been deployed to 2 girls' middle schools in Mingora city @ 30 Personnel per school. More over security forces have been deployed to Jehan Zeb College as well.

Other Losses

Girls' school destroyed	86
Boys' school Destroyed	62
Police Station Destroyed	2
Police Post Destroyed	12
Video Centers destroyed	80
CDs Shops destroyed	300
Barber shop destroyed	25
bridges destroyed	24
BHUs Destroyed	15
electricity Grad station destroyed	1
Main Gas Supply line destroyed	1
suspected Militant arrested	1677
Hotel Closed	700+
Hotel Industry related person become job less	30,000
Police Resigned from service	700
Displaced From(Kabal, Khwaza khela,Matta and Mingora)	700,000
No Of DPOs Transferred	2
No of DCOs Transferred	5
No of DIGs Transferred	1
Cable Network Closed	02 time
Cable Network blown	1(Ali cable)
No Of Children whose School are closed	400,000
No of affected union councils	34

Source: Prepared by the Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy (AIRRA) www.airra.org

Dear Readers,

We are encouraged by many communications from Canada and other parts of the world, but especially Pukhtunkhwa, which we greatly value and appreciate. Our deepest thanks go to those who contribute to the IDEAS magazine.

We plan to have an interview with Teri C McLuhan, the maker of the wonderful feature documentary film “The Frontier Gandhi: Badshah Khan, a Torch for Peace”, which was screened in Toronto, Canada on January 14 and 15, 2009.

If you find this magazine useful, please feel free to disseminate it, and of course help us make it better by your inputs.

Thank You,

Coordinator Working Committee

Pashtun Peace Forum –Canada 
(pashtuninstitute@yahoo.com)

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Disclaimer
In order to promote discussion of issues regarding peace and development in Pashtun areas, the Pashtun Peace Forum (PPF) publishes articles on a regular basis. The views expressed in articles published in IDEAS or on www.pashtunpeaceforum.org  are those of the authors alone. The authors do not represent the views or opinions of PPF volunteer board, nor do they represent the views or opinions of the any entity affiliated with the PPF.

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I D E A S

Bimonthly Magazine of Pashtun Peace Forum, Canada  
November/December, 2008 -  No. 4

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