I D E A S – The Newsletter of Pashtun Peace Forum, Canada 

Volume 1, Number 2, August 1, 2008
Pashtun Peace Forum is working for peace and development of Pashtun and smaller nations in South Asia.

Contents

EDITORIAL:  Structural Distortions and Pashtuns Travails
Dr. S. Zulfiqar Gilani................ Pg 1

The Great Game and the Sufferings of Pashtuns

Fatima Ahmed........................ pg 3

 

Swat Valley: Views and Perceptions
Naeem Khan, Jahan Zeb,
Inayat kakar  .......................... pg 5

 

Countering Terrorism in the Pashtun belt—Ideas for Networking
Khadim Hussain...................... pg 7

 

FATA’s Growing Disconnect Afrasiab Khattak .................... pg 9

 

Al-Qaeda: A Hydra-Headed Monster………………….............pg  11

My death dies every day ..... pg 13

 

 

Editorial Board
S. Zulfiqar  Gilani (Editor-in Chief)
Jahan Zeb Khan (Managing Editor)
Naeem Khan  (Opinion Editor)
Inayat Khan Kakar (News Editor)

Contact:
Pashtun Peace Forum
120 Wentworth Street North
Hamilton, ON L8L 5V7, Canada
E:pashtuninstitute@yahoo.com
Web: pashtunpeaceforum.org
Tel: (905) 296 4612,(905)277 2854

 

It is interesting that the state did not play any facilitative role in proper investment of monies sent home by Pashtun workers. Given the challenged nature of the Pakistani state, this was not surprising or unexpected.

While the structural imbalances of power effect most citizens of Pakistan, the Pashtuns are doubly impaired because a considerable subset of their people live in the tribal areas (FATA), which has a highly unusual and backward looking administrative arrangement. It is not germane to go into details of what is wrong with that, but a few macro issues are sign-posted.

The administrative arrangements in the FATA are a legacy of the British, who had arrived at those in order to protect and further their interests. The interests of the people living in the tribal areas were never in consideration when those arrangements were crafted. The tribal people were residing in India but had no citizenship rights. More importantly, even a cursory examination of those arrangements reveals that the people in the tribal areas were considered ‘children of a lesser God’. They were controlled by draconian laws through a system of patronage, at the apex of which a civil servant lorded in the form of a Political Agent. Unfortunately, the creation of Pakistan did not result in even an iota of change in administrative set-up of FATA. However, it is not possible to prevent economic and socio-political change anywhere.

Consequently, the Pashtuns of the tribal areas find themselves in a somewhat bizarre and surrealistic situation. Their lives are inevitably changing, but the administrative arrangements under which they have to live are frozen in early 20^th century time. Such a disjunction at this big a level has its fallouts, largely in making the life of the people living in those areas extremely difficult.

In a word, a majority of the Pashtuns, along with the rest of the people of Pakistan, are suffering because of the gross distortions in the state power arrangements and the prevailing severely challenged governance and administrative arrangements. On top of that, those who live in the tribal areas of FATA are faced with even greater difficulties. If one adds foreign interests to this lethal brew, including the infusion of arms and provision of training, one starts getting a better sense of the increasing violence in the tribal areas, which is spilling over to the NWFP, the rest of Pakistan, and Afghanistan as well. 

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The Great Game and the Sufferings of Pashtuns
Fatima Ahmed

An analysis of the dynamics of the current Pak-Afghan relations and conflict in the region is a difficult and sensitive issue. Tall claims of friendly relations based on a shared history, common religion and intermingling culture notwithstanding, the strain in relations has very deep and entrenched roots. Most politicians, military leaders and intelligentsia alike choose to overlook history when they attempt to tackle this issue. The same ignorance of understanding history translates into wrong policy formulation at regional and national level with devastating effects for the Pukhtuns (Pashtuns) as well as the broader region. As some sage said, ‘If we don not know our history, we will never be able to master our future.’ Recourse to history might give us clues how to deal with the current issues for the benefit of both the countries, the wider world and more importantly the people that inhabit these borderlands - the Pukhtuns. Sadly it is the 42 million Pukhtuns, one of the largest ethnic groups in the world that are the worst sufferers of this conflict. And their suffering started that fateful year, 1839 when the Colonial British Empire crossed the Suleman Range in an attempt to extend their Empire to Central Asia before the Tzarist Russia could swallow it.

The ‘Great Game’, as it was called; has been played over and over again ever since and continues to define the politics of this region. During the two hundred and fifty years since then, the players and the nature of the game has changed and so has the prize; the only constant factor has been the playground and suffering of the Pukhtuns.

That attempt by the British Empire failed to enslave the Pakhtuns completely, but it started a chain of events that bedevils them till today, strains relations between various states in the region, particularly Pakistan and Afghanistan, and draws in external powers. That fateful attempt was also historic, because it represented a change in a centuries old phenomenon. For millennia, countless people and races from Central and South West Asia had been coming southwards, passing through the lands inhabited by the Pukhtuns in the hope of capturing the Indian treasures. Among them were the Greeks under Alexander the Great, Taimur Lung (known as Tamerlane), the Mongol hordes, Ghaznavids, the Mughuls to name a few. The British Empire, through this action, reversed that process. For centuries the flow of cultures, languages, traditions and social values had been southwards. This act beside its political implications also introduced the process of flow of social and cultural values in the opposite direction. On the political side the first round of the Great Game in the 19th century resulted in the division of the Pakhtun nation into three zones of British political influence, the fully controlled settled areas, the semi-autonomous tribal areas, and the independent Afghanistan, sowing the seeds for the subsequent conflict that continues even today.

The second round of this great game, which started with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 70s, with the intention of reaching the warm waters, culminated in the destruction of the social fabric of the Pukhtuns on both sides of the Durand Line, through the introduction of fundamentalism, religious extremism, obscurantism, violence and drugs. This also left them the company of a plethora of various brands of Jihadies, chief among them Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens, Turkmen, South East Asians and even some westerners – a conglomerate of freelance mercenaries with no allegiance to any state or religion, collected by the CIA and its clients for the purpose of defeating communism. The ideological weapon given to this terrorist conglomerate was ‘Jihad’, and the ammunition was religion.

(The Durand Line marks the 2,640 kilometre (1,610 miles) boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan)

These phenomena, over a period of time, shifted the political control from the traditional liberal political leadership to the fringe clergy, which culminated in bringing the hardliner Taliban in power. This also resulted in their association with the terrorists of the world exemplified by Osama Bin Laden and his shadowy organization Al-Qaeeda. These wrong policies set in motion a chain reaction of radicalization of the Pakhtun society, the effects of which are still spreading as proved by the events in FATA and even some settled areas of NWFP recently.

The third round was a logical consequence of this phenomenon and was apparently triggered by the events of 9/11, but had at the core other motives too: The emergence of China as a potential contender for global power; the world’s second largest oil and gas reserves in Central Asia; and the so-called western objective of bringing democracy to the Muslim world. This game is still being played out in the deserts, valleys and hamlets of Helmand, Kandahar and Kabul, but also in the tribal areas and NWFP, though at a different level. One wonders where this round will leave the Pakhtuns. The hapless Pakhtuns can only wish it ends in something positive, hopefully democracy, peace, and social development. The chances may seem remote, given the current sequence of events. However, hope lies in the fact that this time around the players are global and so are the stakes. Unfortunately, the global players this time around too, are not letting the Pukhtuns; the worst sufferers, to have a say in what is to be their future. If past history is any guide, the solution lies in letting this proud nation to unite and decide themselves what is best for them. If they are in peace, the whole region is likely to enjoy peace and prosperity. A failure this time around will be catastrophic not only for the Pakhtuns but also for the entire region and even the world.

That the regional and global policy makers either ignore to acknowledge, or continue to sweep under the carpet, the fact that Pukhtuns lie at the heart of the conflict and also hold the solution to it, is an understatement. However we might approach it, the one thing that history suggests is that unless the wrongs done to this poor but proud nation during the past two and a half centuries are addressed, no long term solution can be found to the conflict which has claimed hundreds of thousands of, mostly Pakhtuns, lives. Till the sufferings of the unfortunate Pakhtun nation on both sides of the Durand Line are mitigated; no one in the region is likely to live in peace.

The big question is, how can this suffering be mitigated? This question demands answers, which no one seems to want to try and provide. It is in fact a fundamental dichotomy in the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as the political division of the Pakhtun lands and people within Pakistan which make the basis of the conflict and suffering in this region. The existence of the Durand Line, which divides the Pakhtun nation unnaturally without any consideration of humanity, coupled with the divisions of their polity within Pakistan, ensures that we Pukhtuns will continue to suffer and the region will remain mired in conflict. Historically, all divided nationalities, particularly those inhabiting buffer regions between major powers, as is the case of Pakhtuns, have been victims of conflict, abuse, manipulation, and at times being used as proxies. The Kurds who are divided between Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran are another case in point. Add to this the complexities of competing political ideologies, language, culture, tribalism, backwardness and illiteracy, and to top it all an influx of religious extremism, and you find yourself in a quagmire like the Pashtuns find themselves in. The solution lies in making the Pukhtun body whole - once again.

Fatima Ahmed is writing extensively on Pashtuns and Afghan issues. Email: fatimakhan7699@gmail.com

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Swat Valley: Views and Perceptions
Naeem Khan, Jahan Zeb, Inayat kakar 

The militant activity in Pashtun-inhabited regions of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) (Pukhtunkwa) and tribal areas (FATA) has become an international focus increasingly reported by world media and discussed by forums concerned with global peace and stability. Lately, pressure is being built up on Pakistan to take serious steps regarding militant sanctuaries in FATA and reigning in its spy agency accused of fomenting insurgency in Afghanistan. 

All these are overdue happenings and measures. What isn’t getting due projection is the damage militancy is causing to the civic life and the already poor economy and infrastructure of the areas affected by militancy.  The views of the common people of the area regarding the origin and nature of the new militant phase on its “new playing field” have also got little attention from media. The official statements and the Pakistani media, which have little Pashtun representation, have frequently tried to convince the world that the insurgency has local support. 

 

Nevertheless, the reality is different from what it is being portrayed or appears. The way the militancy has spread in different Pashtun areas and played havoc with the lives of common people tells a different story. Swat is one example.   

Like FATA, Swat Valley – which was one of Pakistan’s famous tourist areas prior to the present anarchy and is home to about 1.6 million peace-loving citizens, has been turned into an active base for militants. This has had an adverse impact on the lives of people. Uncertainty, threat to life and property, long hours of curfews, deteriorating law and order situation, and a dysfunctional public services sector has made the lives of peoples miserable in the once peaceful and prosperous valley. Inflation has further aggravated the problem. 

Although subversive elements were active in Swat Valley before, the imposition of emergency by General Musharraf last year coincided with the aggressive emergence of Maulana Fazlullah (also known as the Radio Mullah), a firebrand Pakistani Taleban leader, as the supreme power in the valley, who established a parallel administration. Since then, sabotage including bomb blasts, assassination of traditional elders and prominent political leaders, demolition of schools, and destruction of other symbols of modern life has become the order of the day.  Latest in this rising tide of subversion, violence, and intimidation is the blowing of Malam Jabba Ski resort and bridges in Matta Tehsil and issuance of ultimatum to members of the provincial and national parliaments, mostly belonging to Awami National Party  (ANP) from the valley to resign or else face the extremists wrath.

There is a general agreement among local observers and analysts that the rise of Maulana Fazlullah was allowed because it provided ‘strategic depth’ and extended territory to militant sanctuaries for a sustained activity in the region. Some people also point to Swat Valley as a link between Afghanistan and Kashmir, both of which have been focus of militant struggle, as a factor in growth of militancy in the valley.  From Swat, militant forces can be mobilized both ways. Keen observers point to as how the present militancy also has a role in local governance contrary to the previous ones that were confined to training camps and publicly engaged only in ideological propaganda for fundraising and Jehadi recruitment.

Many people argue that the promotion of militant elements required curtailing the influence of traditional political and social elite of the area whose entrenched interest could have come in the way of such schemes. Therefore, many influential people have been eliminated or intimidated in the past few months.

(Malam Jabba Ski resort)

Mohammad Afzal Khan Lala, a respected and influential elder of the valley, who was opposition leader in Pakistan's National Assembly and also a federal minister, survived an attempt on his life while his two security guards were killed. Later, two of his grandsons were also killed. He didn’t hesitate to blame the state for allowing the violence in the valley. Khan Lala has publicly said that the state machinery is directly involved in the making of people like Mulana Fazlullah because such schemes serve the vested interests.

Sajjad Gul - a law student at the University of Peshawar, who hails from Swat Valley, informs that a few days ago an influential Pashtun elder of Swat and a local Pakistan Peoples Party leader Abdul Kabir Khan, was brutally killed by the militants along with his three sons and wife in broad day light because he didn’t abide by their strict rule of living.” According to Mr. Sajjad “hundreds of militants attacked his home.  Kabir Khan and one his son bravely defended themselves for a long time exchanging heavy fire with the militants. They asked the help of Pakistan Army stationed about two kilometres from his home. He also called the mayor of the area but no one came to his rescue and finally, he was killed along with his family”. According to Mr. Sajjad “Kabir Khan has become a hero for the people of the area because of his steadfastness and courage. People are openly discussing as how the authorities turned a blind eye to the plight of Kabir Khan. Most people now are very suspicious of the real agenda behind the militants uprising.”

“In another incident, militants tried to bomb the car of Mr. Jamal Nasir, the mayor of Swat, who was on his way to another town along with his wife and children. Mr. Jamal and his family narrowly escaped the attack with minor injuries. Fearing the threat to their lives, the family shifted to Islamabad, the Pakistani capital. Later, militants burnt his deserted house and his fruit gardens and orchards.” Sajjad reports from Swat.

 (Malam Jabba Ski resort –another view)

It is interesting to note that, in recent weeks, a number of local religious scholars opposed to militancy have also been killed. Girl schools are the special target of extremism. So far scores of girl schools have been destroyed.  A number of families are migrating to other areas of the province for education of their daughters and sisters. A large number of girls have stopped going to school for fear of attack from extremist elements. There is a large number of private-owned English medium schools in the towns and rural areas of the valley that have to operate under fear. They may become the next target.  The closure of these schools will not only limit educational opportunities for children but also contribute to unemployment because they are providing jobs to significant number of youth.

According to M. Naeem Khan of Brock University, Canada - who also belongs to Swat, "militants on the east side of Pak-Afghan border have gained strength and turned from a patch-work of loosely-connected groups and factions into a well-netted and organized force with central leadership and good coordination and communication. They can now control larger swathes of territory and more people. This is remarkable sophistication that will have consequences for future security developments in the region. ”

He further states, “use of militancy as an advanced assault force and as the first line of defense may bring some “strategic dividend” and some short term gains in the form of military aid and economic assistance to Pakistan but it will weaken Pakistani state and further add to the hardships of citizens, particularly Pashtuns.”    

Many Pashtuns think that the bureaucratic and political elite from the Pakistani heartland consider the Pashtun-inhabited region as mere invasion route and a periphery to be used for economic and military gains and a launching pad for gaining foothold in the neighboring countries. The 15 billion dollars aid given to Pakistan is being pointed to in this regard, which is said to be coming at the cost of Pashtun blood.  This perception is becoming more prevalent and is not without ground as for as the common man understanding of events is concerned. Many people are critical that the aid money is proving to be more a cause for the sustained militancy than an incentive to end it. The international community should, therefore, make sure that the aid enhances peace and development rather than worsens it. The Pakistani state also needs to effectively put an end to militancy, restore peace, and start rebuilding the lives of people in order to mitigate such feelings of alienation from the state.

Whatever may be the symptoms, the present problems in Pashtun areas are the accumulative effect of complex geopolitics and war on Pashtun lands spread over decades and centuries and have more foreign causes than indigenous.  The international community should, therefore, identify the root causes of the problem and stabilize the real sources of instability. Pashtuns have already played a role and paid a heavy price in a long-drawn struggle that ended in the liberation of many groups and nations in Eurasia. They should no more be treated as a peripheral factor by Pakistani state as well as the international community in the geopolitical developments in the region. Their rights under a civilized law as in the rest of the free world and in a genuinely democratic and truly FEDERAL system should be ensured to solve the problem on durable basis.

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Countering Terrorism in the Pashtun belt—Ideas for Networking
Khadim Hussain

With the enormous escalation of violence across the Pashtun belt of Pakistan and Afghanistan in the recent times, the people around the globe feel an imminent danger to the Pashtun culture, history, society and political institutions. The Saudi model of Islam, the Pakistani ‘strategic depth’, the US geostrategic and economic interests and the failure of the Pashtun political and social leadership in Pakistan and Afghanistan to respond to the challenges have put a question mark to the very existence of the way of life and traditions of the Pashtuns and all other people living between the River Oxus and the River Indus. However, it is heartening to note that the Pashtun intelligentsia in the mainland, hinterlands, and Diasporas has become increasingly active to analyze and investigate the situation and recommend solutions to the problem, besides facilitating the political leadership to engage in dealing with the predicament. The formation of the Pashtun Peace Forum (PPF) by the friends in Canada and North America and its newsletter Ideas are right steps in the right direction.

The maiden issue of Ideas of July 2008 carries interesting articles by our well-known scholar friends whose seriousness, commitment and sustainable work for the Pashtun cause are known by all and sundry in the Pashtun belt. In his article titled ‘Swimming against the tide’, Dr. Zulfiqar H. Gilani, former Vice Chancellor (VC) University of Peshawar, has raised a very interesting point. In his opinion, the fatalities of the common people due to the high intensity conflicts in the Pashtun belt have never been known to the world while there is accurate counting of the deaths and casualties of the US and Pakistani security forces. It reminds me one of the articles by Chomsky titled ‘We own the world’ in which he says that counting of the fatalities is done for the people and not for the ‘un people’. It is probably the responsibility of the think-tanks like Ariyana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy (AIRRA) and forums like the PPF to initiate a process of extensive research in this regard.

AIRRA has started working on two relevant issues and hope to complete those within a couple of months, besides the papers on Terrorism in the Pashtun belt and Food Crisis in the Pashtun belt. First, is a study of the schools that have been destroyed—the nature of schools (Boys or Girls and private or public), the strength in those schools, their location, the situation in which the schools were destroyed, financial losses incurred, and the responsibility taken by different militant groups for burning the schools. The second issue we are working on is counting the fatalities of the non-combatants during the violence—suicide attacks, beheading, burning, and bombing.

It is really shocking to note that in a recent burning episode in Shaur Swat leader Abdul Kabir Khan, was not only killed, but the main door of his house, where his three small kids and his wife were present, was locked and the house was torched from outside. Very few instances of barbarism can match this act of violence. Almost the same happened with Bakht Baidar Khan, Vice President Awami National Party (ANP) District Swat. He was taken out of his house in the early hours of the night, his hands were broken and his throat holed. It is to be recalled that the people of the village had called the security forces after Baidar was taken out of home. The village lies in the midst of check posts.

Anybody with any opinion and capability to inspire people around was target killed even after the military announced its victory over the militants. The pattern seems to be the same from the South to the North of the Pashtun belt. If this barbaric violence is not stopped now, we may find no body worth any count in the Pashtun belt after a few years. At the same time, the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan seem to be incapable or unwilling to put a halt to this barbarism. Peace deals are signed but their implementation is left to the supernatural forces, while the non-state organizations are provided with a large space to regroup, refuel and re-weaponize their ranks to carry out target killing unabated.

M. Naeem Khan in his article titled ‘Countering militancy’ suggests that “Pashtun political leadership, intelligentsia, and mainstream should work together for rather greater cohesion and understanding among themselves to tackle the problem from within”. This is probably the only way out in the present circumstances. The present political leadership of PPP and ANP was voted to power by the hapless Pashtuns to prove their inclination to secular and modern way of life. Ironically, it is the same leadership who agrees with the militants to implement Islam (read Wahabism) in letter and spirit. Tragically, the leadership has become almost isolated and inaccessible to intelligentsia and opinion makers.

A few core issues are to be taken into consideration for countering terrorism and extremism in the Pashtun belt. First, the issue of state and non state organizations: Do we want to keep the nation state on the assumption that nation state will in due course of time develop institutions that would do away with structural violence? If we suppose that nation states (The US, Pakistan, China, Iran, Russia, India, etc.) are the part of the problem, then what would be our strategy to deal with the militant non state organizations? If we think that nation states have the right to use force against non state organizations to establish their writ for the rule of law, what would be the intensity and amount of the use of that force? Is it possible for the Pakistani state alone to fight non state militant organizations, which are hell bent to obliterate whatever worthwhile is left in the Pashtun belt? Should we allow the militants to trample around because we presume them to be ‘revolutionary forces’ (This term has been used for them by none other than Dr. Azmat Hayat, the present VC of the University of Peshawar)? Do we want the US to stop all kinds of interventions in the Pashtun belt?

The establishment of the Pashtun Peace Forum and publication of the Ideas may be able to facilitate the much needed networking of the efforts by intelligentsia, opinion makers and civil society organizations. It is this networking which might bring about the news of a peaceful dawn in the Pashtun belt.

Khadim Hussain  is a socio-political analyst based in Islamabad  and the  coordinator of AIRRA. 
Email: khadim.2005@gmail.com  

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FATA’s Growing Disconnect
July 31, 2008, From The Dawn internet edition
 Afrasiab Khattak

IT is hardly an exaggeration that the security of Pakistan, Afghanistan, the entire region and indeed that of the whole world will be defined by developments in Fata over the next few months. Different scenarios are being painted by military strategists and political experts.

Al Qaeda, after regrouping in the militant sanctuaries of the area, is acquiring the capacity to repeat attacks in North America or Europe similar to those carried out in 2001 in the US.

If reports about the exchanges between Pakistan and the US at the highest level are anything to go by it is pretty clear that the US will retaliate against Pakistan, probably even more severely than it did against the Taliban-dominated Afghanistan. Similarly the use of these militant sanctuaries for cross-border fighting is so large in scale (in fact all the six political agencies bordering Afghanistan are being used) that denial in this regard is no longer plausible.

The federal government has to either admit defeat or muster the political will to resolve the problem, or else justify the existence of militant sanctuaries by explaining their usefulness to the national interest. We have run out of time and this decision cannot be delayed any more as there are no takers of the denial line.

As if this were not enough, armed lashkars (armies) from militant sanctuaries in Fata are poised to penetrate/invade the contiguous settled districts. The events in Hangu some three weeks back are a case in point. The Hangu police arrested four Taliban commanders from a car that also contained weapons, explosive material and manuals for making bombs in a place called Doaba not far away from the Orakzai Agency border.

Hundreds of Taliban surrounded the Doaba police station and demanded the commanders’ release. They also blocked the Hangu-Kurram highway. During this confrontation the Frontier Constabulary was ambushed near Zargari village and 16 security personnel were killed. Subsequently the army was called in to launch a military operation in Hangu. This action was not just in retaliation for the murder of 16 FC men but also came in view of the threat of attack by four to five thousand Taliban from Orakzai and Kurram agencies.

By now the said military operation has been completed and the targets achieved to the extent that the Taliban have been chased out of Hangu. Nevertheless, they have fled to Orakzai Agency where they are regrouping and preparing for future attacks.

The NWFP (Pakhtunkhwa) government is in a quandary. It has to call in the army whenever armed lashkars threaten to overrun a district as the police force simply does not have the capacity to fight an ever-expanding insurgency.

After Swat the army has also been deployed in Hangu. In view of the militant sanctuaries situated nearby, the army cannot be withdrawn in the near future. Imagine if the story is repeated in other vulnerable districts. Will the army also have to be deployed in all these other districts? Will such measures not bring the existence of the civilian provincial government into question?

Is it not amazing that in spite of such high stakes the presidency that has a monopoly over governance in Fata seems to show no anxiety over the prevailing situation? It is continuing with the policy of keeping Fata a black hole where terrorist groups from across the globe run their bases. It is still a no-go area for the media and civil society, and so far there is no corrective measure or policy change in sight. So much so that we have failed to take even the most preliminary step of extending the Political Parties Act to Fata.

It is only natural that we are perturbed when attacks are launched from across the border. But should we not be equally sensitive to the loss of our sovereignty over Fata to militant groups? Strangely enough we do not seem to be bothered about the militants’ total control of Fata. When the international media carries reports about this situation we dismiss them as ‘enemy’ propaganda against Pakistan. We have failed to grasp the fact that in the post-cold war world there is a universal consensus about two things. One, that all assault weapons that can be used for launching a war cannot be allowed to be kept in private possession. Two, that no state will allow the use of its soil by non-state players against another state. The entire world is astounded by our fixation with the cold war mode. We have developed an incredible capacity to live in unreality. This is indeed dangerous for any state system but it can be catastrophic for a state dancing in a minefield.

Where does all this leave the people of Fata? They are victims and not perpetrators as some people would like us to believe. They are in fact in triple jeopardy. Firstly they are groaning under the draconian Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) of 1901. They have no access to the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution of Pakistan since they are not justiciable outside of the jurisdiction of the higher judiciary.

Secondly the tribal belt has almost been occupied by foreign and local militant organisations that are better equipped, better trained and better financed than the local population. More than 160 tribal leaders have been killed by terrorists in North and South Waziristan who operate with total impunity. Today’s Fata is not dissimilar to the Taliban and Al Qaeda controlled Afghanistan before 9/11.

Thirdly, the people of Fata get caught in the crossfire between militants and security forces from both sides of the Durand Line. The so-called collateral damage has seen a cancerous growth in Fata. The people of Fata have lost the support and protection of the state. They have no access to the media, courts and hospitals or to humanitarian assistance. The only intervention by state players takes place through their armies and air forces in which people of the tribal area are mostly on the receiving end.

For any informed and sensitive Pakistani, the situation in the tribal area is the top-most priority when it comes to policy formation and implementation. We must realise that the question of dismantling militant sanctuaries in Fata and taking short-term and long-term measures to open up the area and integrate it with the rest of the country needs urgent national attention if we are to avoid the impending catastrophe.

Afrasiab Khattak is the Peace Envoy Government of NWFP (Pakhtunkhwa) Pakistan and President Awami National Party Pakhtunkhwa.

http://www.dawn.com/2008/07/31/ed.htm#5

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 AL-QAEDA:
A hydra-headed monster

Jul 17th 2008, From The Economist print edition

Al-Qaeda may have been cut down in Afghanistan, but it is growing in Pakistan’s border area

 

THE Taliban Hotel has changed clientele. The abandoned Afghan homestead, close to the border with Pakistan, had long been used by insurgents as a resting place on their way to fight in Afghanistan; now it accommodates a contingent of American and Afghan soldiers.

This newest link in the chain of American border outposts is something of a fluke. The Americans discovered its importance only last September, when a patrol ran into a group of insurgents and found that the nearby hilltops provided good observation and electronic listening posts into Pakistan’s ungoverned region of North Waziristan. “After three weeks there we decided we couldn’t leave,” said Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Fenzel.

So now his men of the 1-503rd Airborne battalion are overseeing the construction of a new government and police compound, and a “cultural centre” that will be turned into a mosque. The Americans are trying to win over surrounding villagers with the promise of roads, construction jobs and government services. They are also hoping to organise a jirga, or council of elders, with tribesmen from both sides of the frontier to pacify the area.

This is a very different way of conducting military business than when the Americans first got to Afghanistan in 2001. Then the emphasis was on killing or capturing terrorists. Lots of civilians were killed in bombing raids. But as the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan worsened in 2006 and Iraq slid towards bloody anarchy, American forces overhauled their tactics. The counter-insurgency manual issued in 2006 says their first task is to “protect the population”, assist economic development and improve governance in order to isolate the insurgents. American troops are no longer enjoined to “find, fix, finish” but to “clear, hold, build”. These methods are proving helpful. But there are too few troops, whether foreign or Afghan. And they can do little about the sanctuary on the other side of the border.

These days Pakistan’s tribal belt along the frontier with Afghanistan makes up the world’s most worrying reservoir of jihadists, containing an opaque mixture of Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, Pakistani sectarian extremists, Kashmiri militants and foreign fighters of all colours. Mixed in among them are al-Qaeda’s senior leaders who, in the view of American officials, act as “force multipliers”—a small cadre, perhaps numbering only in the hundreds, who provide technical expertise, training, ideological rigour and sometimes funds.

All have been protected by the honour code of the Pushtun tribes, with whom foreign fighters have forged close relations since the days of the anti-Soviet jihad. Some of the foreigners have taken local wives, and many Pushtun warriors have embraced the ideology of global jihad.

The Pakistani tribal belt is less of a haven for al-Qaeda than Taliban-ruled Afghanistan had been before 2001. Yet it is secure enough, says last year’s threat assessment by America’s intelligence agencies, to provide al-Qaeda with many of the advantages it once derived from its base across the border in Afghanistan: a place to regroup its senior lieutenants, broadcast its propaganda, train a new generation of militants and plan fresh attacks around the world. Among those believed to be hiding in the tribal areas is Abu Khabab al-Masri, famous for being in charge of experiments with chemical and biological agents in which dogs were killed on video.

The Afghan insurgency is intensifying year by year; in May and June this year it was deadlier for Western troops than the Iraqi one. The Taliban and al-Qaeda are tantalisingly close to hand, yet distressingly hard to reach.

Pakistani forces, some of whose outposts are within shouting distance of American positions, play an ambiguous role: sometimes they turn a blind eye to the insurgents, and sometimes they help the Americans spot them. Relations between commanders on both sides of the border have usually been cordial. But ask American officers whether they regard Pakistan as a friend or a foe, and many reply: “Both.”

On June 10th American jets killed 11 members of Pakistan’s Frontier Corps during bombing raids against insurgents on the border of Afghanistan’s Kunar province. Five days later, after a brazen Taliban attack on Kandahar prison that freed 1,000 inmates, including about 400 Taliban, Afghanistan’s president, Hamid Karzai, threatened to send his forces into Pakistan. His officials claim Pakistani intelligence was behind a recent attempt to kill him.

American soldiers do sometimes fire into Pakistan, and special forces and the CIA work together to gather information on the big fish across the frontier. Once in a while missiles go off from American unmanned aircraft or ground artillery to strike at wanted men. American officers recognise that, even with the best will of the world, the Pakistani army would struggle to keep control of its remote frontier. The question these days is how hard it is trying.

When Pakistan was founded as a Muslim state at the partition of British India in 1947, the colonial border arrangements were left largely unchanged. The frontier with Afghanistan was always fuzzy. A strip of mountainous territory on the Pakistani side, carved out by the British as a buffer zone, remained as autonomous tribal lands whose population had few of the rights accorded to other Pakistani citizens.

The seven districts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are run at arm’s length by the president’s office through the governor of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the “agents” he appoints among tribal elders. FATA has been one of Pakistan’s most neglected regions. Income per person is half the (already low) national average.

Successive Pakistani governments have encouraged the tribes to emphasise their Islamic rather than their Pushtun identity. Pakistan (together with America and Saudi Arabia) supported the anti-Soviet jihad and later it backed the Taliban. Afghanistan, it felt, offered “strategic depth” in case of war with India.

President Pervez Musharraf made an abrupt U-turn by co-operating with America in toppling the Taliban in 2001, but although he sent the army into FATA to hunt the remnants of al-Qaeda, he allowed the Taliban to regroup. Apologists say Mr Musharraf could not take on too many enemies and had other things to worry about. Critics retort that he deliberately sought to destabilise Afghanistan or, more charitably, that he hedged his bet because he feared America would soon withdraw.

Pakistan’s military campaign hurt al-Qaeda, at least for a time. Intercepted letters from Ayman al-Zawahiri and other al-Qaeda figures, written in 2005, complain of weakness, shortage of funds, difficulties communicating with the outside world and the ever-present fear of arrest or assassination. Nevertheless al-Qaeda proved hard to separate from the Taliban, and the Pakistani army suffered painful losses in the ensuing clashes. In 2006 Mr Musharraf agreed to a truce. All this left both al-Qaeda and the Taliban stronger than before; worse, the Taliban acquired a Pakistani branch that spread violence and radicalism across the country. Last December Benazir Bhutto, a Pakistani opposition leader, was killed in an attack for which the Americans blamed the Pakistani Taliban.

Mr Musharraf thus finds himself attacked by Americans for failing to curb militants, and by militants (and many Pakistanis) for being an American stooge. After eight years of military rule, Pakistanis earlier this year voted the opposition into power. But the country is still confused, even in denial, over the threat from militants.

Sounding the retreat

Events in South Waziristan, the largest of the tribal agencies, are particularly worrying. Last month the Pakistani army invited journalists on a rare visit to the area to see how it had dealt with the tribal redoubt of Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Tehrik-i-Taliban, the umbrella group of the Pakistani Taliban. In January the army told some 200,000 people to leave their homes before sweeping through with attack helicopters, artillery and tanks.

A few days after the journalists’ visit, Mr Mehsud summoned them back to the region to demonstrate that he remained in charge. The Taliban leader, surrounded by hundreds of long-haired fighters, denied accusations that he had ordered the killing of Ms Bhutto, blaming Mr Musharraf instead. He said he would not agree to stop cross-border attacks: “Islam does not recognise frontiers and borders.”

Pakistan’s prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, insists that his new civilian government must be left to deal with extremism in its own way. He says the government will fight terrorists vigorously, but has to regain the support of a sceptical public. The tribal areas need to be integrated into the rest of the country both politically and economically in order to isolate extremists. Peace deals have already been signed in the “settled” areas of NWFP, but Mr Gilani insists that “no talks will be held with anyone refusing to lay down arms.”

All this sounds very similar to what the Americans are trying to do across the border in Afghanistan, yet they are not reassured. It is the army, not the government, that is in charge of the talks, and the Americans fear that it will surrender control to the Taliban and al-Qaeda, as it has done in the past. And the talks will do nothing to improve matters in Baluchistan, the seat of the main body of Taliban leaders known as the “Quetta Shura”, that runs the most intense front of the insurgency in the southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand, apparently untroubled by the Pakistani authorities.

America would like to see Pakistan adopt some of its counter-insurgency methods to strengthen its grip on the tribal areas, and is offering about $750m over five years for social and economic development in FATA. But the Pakistani army seems reluctant to change its thinking. Having lost about 1,000 soldiers since 2001 and had 250 of its soldiers captured by Mr Mehsud’s fighters, it is tired and demoralised. NATO says the number of cross-border infiltrations has risen sharply this year.

One bit of hopeful news was the rout of Islamist parties in NWFP in the recent election, where the winner was the secular Pushtun nationalist party, the Awami National Party, which opposes the militants. But the provincial capital, Peshawar, is surrounded by armed groups, prompting a paramilitary operation to stop the city falling into their hands. The province’s chief minister, Ameer Haider Hoti, claims that past Pakistani governments had built up armed factions as a tool of foreign policy. Now, he says, “this monster was created, and nobody knows how to handle it.”

http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11701231

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My death dies every day (shared by Khadim Hussain)
My land is no more the land of flowers
Of doves and pigeons
My land has heads scattered in every farmland

Blood is no more costly
It's running like water in every street
Now I cant say

And my beloved is not scared
When I tell her
I will die if you leave me

Death is a norm in my land
Its no more the land of flowers, doves and pigeons
It's now the land of flames, bombs and armoured cars

I can't imagine the nightingale singing
And can't have the fantasy of making love
Coz this is no more the land of flowers, doves and pigeons.

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Resolution:
The Pashtun Peace Forum demands the government of Pakhtunkhwa (NWFP)  to provide due representation to Hindko, Khowar and Seriaki languages and to include diverse communities of Pakhtunkhwa in the affairs of the government.

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PPF values your contributions and opinions. If you would like to share your contributions, please contact us (however, we reserve editorial rights). Join us in trying to understand the situation.

Pashtun Peace Forum -Canada
120 Wentworth Street North
Hamilton, ON L8L 5V7, Canada
E:pashtuninstitute@yahoo.com
Web: pashtunpeaceforum.org
Tel: (905) 296 4612,(905)277 2854
Thank you (MaNuna)!

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